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ABSTRACT
My dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay proposes a theory on the
dynamics of productivity dispersion. In response to a negative profit shock, the lead-
ing firm responds by increasing R&D effort to recover the lost profit, while the laggard
firm responds by reducing R&D effort because a lowered profit means a smaller return
to innovation. Such heterogeneous R&D responses explain the observed countercycli-
cal productivity dispersion. The second essay engages in an empirical study confirm-
ing the theory in the previous essay. Parametric and semi-parametric reduced-form
regressions both exhibit heterogeneous responses in firms’ R&D intensity to the neg-
ative profit shock as suggested by my theory. A structural estimation of the model
using GMM and data from U.S. manufacturing firms produces the heterogeneous
R&D responses and the consequential larger productivity dispersion in response to
a negative profit shock. The structurally estimated model also shows a higher pro-
ductivity growth rate following the shock, which is due to the higher R&D effort
exerted by the leading firm. The third essay focuses on the firm decision between
R&D projects different in quality and time structure. With a theoretical model, I
show that a temporary protectionist policy leads a positive measure of domestic firms
vi
to switch from the long-term to the short-term innovation project. It is because the
policy raises the profitability of innovation in the short term, and some firms sacrifice
quality for the timeliness of innovation as a response, resulting in a lower produc-
tivity growth rate. The above theory on firms’ decisions regarding R&D projects is





1.1 On the Dynamics of Productivity Dispersion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 On the Quality and Timing of Innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2 A Theory of the Dynamics of Productivity Dispersion 8
2.1 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Impulse Responses to Negative Profit Shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.1 Identifying Negative Profit Shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.2 Impulse Responses of Productivity Dispersion to NPS . . . . . 12
2.2.3 Impulse Responses of R&D Dispersion to NPS . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3 Technology Ladder and Heterogeneous Climbers . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3.1 Model Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3.2 Existence of the Markov Perfect Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3.3 Stationary Distribution of the Technology Gap . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3.4 Expected Technology Gap under Limiting Distribution . . . . 25
2.4 Extended Model with the Negative Profit Shock . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.4.1 Modelling the Shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4.2 Analysis of Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4.3 Responses of R&D to the Negative Profit Shock . . . . . . . . 31
3 Heterogeneous R&D Responses to Negative Profit Shocks 33
3.1 Structual Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
viii
3.1.1 The Parameterized Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.2 Quantitative Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2.1 Numerical Solution of the Baseline Model . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2.2 Numerical Solution of the Extended Model . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2.3 Simulation of the Impact of the Negative Profit Shock . . . . . 41
3.3 Empirical Evidence of Heterogeneous R&D Responses to the NPS . . 43
3.4 Productivity Growth, and Why Dispersion is Good . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.4.1 Growth Rates in and off the Stationary Equilibrium . . . . . . 48
3.4.2 Counterfactuals on the Rate of Spillover . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4 Quality and Timing of Innovation 56
4.1 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.2 Historical Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.3 Estimation of Changes in R&D Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.3.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.3.2 Response of RRD to the Removal of Protection . . . . . . . . 60
4.3.3 Timing Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.3.4 Control for Cross-Industry Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.4 A Theory on the Quality and Timing of Innovation . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.4.1 Consumer Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.4.2 Firm Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.4.3 Innovation Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.4.4 Protectionist Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.4.5 Existence of Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.4.6 Effect of Temporary Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.4.7 Extension: Effect of Permanent Protection . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.5 Tests of the Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
ix
5 Conclusions 80
5.1 On the Dynamics of Productivity Dispersion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.2 On the Quality and Timing of Innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
A Data 82
A.1 Data Source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
A.2 Data Pre-processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
A.3 Construction of Key Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
A.4 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
B Proofs 86
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
B.2 Proof of Proposition 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
B.3 Proof of Lemma 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
B.4 Proof of Lemma 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
B.5 Proof of Lemma 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
B.6 Proof of Proposition 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
B.7 Proof of Proposition 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
B.8 Proof of Proposition 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
B.9 Proof of Lemma 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
B.10 Proof of Proposition 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
B.11 Proof of Proposition 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
B.12 Proof of Proposition 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
B.13 Proof of Proposition 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
B.14 Proof of Proposition 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
C Structural Estimation 100
C.1 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100







3.1 Model Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.2 Fitting of Moments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.3 Responses of R&D intensity to the negative profit shock . . . . . . . 45
4.1 Response of RRD to the Removal of Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.2 Response of RRD to the Removal of Protection, Control for Network
Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
A.1 Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
xii
List of Figures
2·1 Impulse responses of industry-level productivity dispersion to the NPS 13
2·2 Impulse responses of industry-level RDI dispersion to the NPS . . . . 15
2·3 Transition rates across states of technology gap . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3·1 Numerical solution of the baseline model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3·2 Stationary distribution of firm ’s technology gap . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3·3 Numerical solution of the extended model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3·4 Simulation of the impact of negative profit shock . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3·5 Groupwise responses of firm RDI to the negative profit shock . . . . . 47
3·6 Simulation of the impact of negative profit shock on expected in-
stantaneous growth rates . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3·7 Counterfactual stationary distribution of technology gap . . . . . . . 52
3·8 Simulation with counterfactual spillover rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3·9 Industry-level productivity growth with counterfactual spillover rates 55
4·1 Test for Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4·2 Industries Most Connected to Semiconductor Manufacturing . . . . . 65
4·3 Impulse Response of Innovation Value on R&D Expenditure . . . . . 77
4·4 Distributed Correlation between RDE and Future Innovation Value . 78
xiii
List of Abbreviations
BEA . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bureau of Economic Analysis
CI . . . . . . . . . . . . . Connection Index
DID . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference-in-difference
ECDF . . . . . . . . . . . . . Empirical Cumulative Distribution Function
GMM . . . . . . . . . . . . . Generalized Method of Moments
HHI . . . . . . . . . . . . . Herfindahl–Hirschman Index
IRF . . . . . . . . . . . . . Impulse Response Function
MPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . Markov Perfect Equilibrium
NAICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . North American Industry Classification System
NE . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nash Equilibrium
NPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . Negative Profit Shock
PMF . . . . . . . . . . . . . Probability Mass Function
R&D . . . . . . . . . . . . . Research and Development
RDE . . . . . . . . . . . . . R&D Expenditure
RDI . . . . . . . . . . . . . R&D Intensity
RRD . . . . . . . . . . . . . Returns to R&D
SIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . Standard Industrial Classification
TFP . . . . . . . . . . . . . Total Factor Productivity
TFP . . . . . . . . . . . . . Revenue-based Total Factor Productivity
R++ . . . . . . . . . . . . . Strictly Positive Real Line
R2++ . . . . . . . . . . . . . Strictly Positive Real Plane





1.1 On the Dynamics of Productivity Dispersion
The first two chapters of the main body of this thesis are about the theoretical and
empirical study of the dynamics of productivity dispersion, respectively. Productivity
dispersion is a measure of the gap between the levels of productivity between the most
and least productive groups of firms in an economy. It has been found to be larger
during recessions than in booms1. What is the cause of this countercyclicality of
productivity dispersion? Is the larger dispersion good or bad for productivity growth
following a negative shock? This thesis sheds new light on these questions by a theory
concerning firm-level heterogeneous R&D behaviors, which finds its support from a
series of empirical tests.
Motivated by my empirical finding that both within-industry R&D intensity (RDI)
and productivity become more dispersed in response to the negative shock to profit,
I propose a technology ladder model where firms with heterogeneous R&D costs en-
gage in a dynamic game of innovation. The difference in R&D strategies determines
the technology gap in the stationary equilibrium. I structurally estimate this model
and bring it to a simulation by hitting it with a negative profit shock (NPS). In
response to the shock, the low R&D cost firm increases its R&D effort on average,
and the high-cost firm reduces its R&D effort. Such heterogeneous R&D responses
translate into a hump-shaped impulse response curve of the technology gap, reproduc-
1For example, in Bloom et al. (2018), Bloom (2014) and Kehrig (2015).
2
ing countercyclical productivity dispersion. The mechanism of heterogeneous R&D
responses to the NPS is verified by reduced-form empirical tests. My quantitative
model also predicts a higher productivity growth rate following the NPS. Moreover,
in the counterfactual analysis, the size of the increase in productivity growth is found
to be positively related to that in the technology gap. In this sense, productivity dis-
persion is good in bad times, as the mechanism that generates it also leads to faster
productivity growth.
I start with an empirical investigation of the impact of the negative profit shock
on within-industry dispersion of productivity and R&D intensity. Using the local
projection method developed by Jordà (2005), and data from U.S. manufacturing
firms, I find larger dispersion of both productivity and RDI in response to the shock
at the industry level. This pattern is robust under different measures of dispersion2.
These findings motivate my interpretation of countercyclical productivity dispersion
as a result of divergence in firms’ R&D activities.
For an analytical study of the behavior of productivity dispersion, I build a tech-
nology ladder model where two firms engage in the R&D races, in which a firm’s profit
is increasing in its technological advantage relative to its competitor. Improvement in
technology comes from innovation; a firm’s innovation follows a Poisson process whose
arrival rate depends on the R&D effort chosen by the firm, and an exogenous rate of
spillover if this firm is the laggard. In this stochastic dynamic game, the stationary
distribution of the gap between technology levels of the two firms is essentially deter-
mined by their R&D costs. Specifically, the firm with lower R&D cost is expected to
be the leader in the stationary equilibrium. I then introduce the negative profit shock
to this model and analyze how firms’ R&D responsds to the shock. I assume firms can
recover the lost profit by innovating, and the degree of such recovery is determined
2The standard measures of dispersion include the interquartile range, 10-90 percentile, and stan-
dard deviation.
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by the technological progress of the leading firm. To shocks with small magnitude,
the leader responds by increasing its R&D effort due to the incentive to recover the
lost profit. To very large shocks, however, both firms respond by reducing their R&D
efforts, because the lowered profit makes innovation unprofitable, and it takes too
many innovations for recovery. These theoretical results motivate my conjecture that
for some shocks with medium magnitude, the leader responds with a higher R&D
effort and the follower with a lower one; such heterogeneity in R&D responses must
lead to countercyclical productivity dispersion.
To provide a ground for this conjecture, I parameterize the model with structural
estimation employing the generalized method of moments (GMM). The simulation of
the parameterized model shows that on average, the low-cost firm exerts higher R&D
effort than does the high-cost firm in the stationary equilibrium. And in response to
the negative profit shock, the low-cost firm raises its R&D effort, while the high-cost
firm lowers its R&D effort. The enlarged difference in R&D efforts results in a hump-
shaped impulse response curve of the technology gap. In this way, the structurally
estimated model reproduces the conjectured mechanism.
I proceed with reduced-form regressions to further test the above mechanism.
The first test is parametric: I identify the heterogeneity in R&D responses using the
within-industry empirical cumulative distribution function (ECDF) of R&D intensity.
After a negative profit shock, firms with low ECDF in RDI in the past exhibits lower
current RDI, while firms with high ECDF in RDI in the past show higher current
RDI. The second test is semiparametric: I sort firms in the same industry-year cell
into ten decile groups by their RDI and replace the ECDF in the previous design
with a set of dummies indicating to which decile group a firm belongs. This approach
shows that the least R&D intensive firms respond to the NPS by reducing RDI, and
the most R&D intensitive firms by increasing RDI. Both of these two empirical tests
4
confirm the prediction of the above quantitative model.
Having confirmed my proposed mechanism in explaining countercyclical produc-
tivity dispersion, I turn to study its implication on productivity growth. My quan-
titative model exhibits a mean-reverting jump in productivity growth rate following
a negative profit shock. And this is because of higher R&D effort from the low-cost
firm, as it tries to recover the lost profit by improving technology. This effect domi-
nates that of the decrease in R&D effort from the high-cost firm through technological
spillover. In other words, the same mechanism generating countercyclical productiv-
ity dispersion is also responsible for the higher productivity growth after bad shocks,
which is called "virtues of bad times" in the literature3. In this sense, productivity
dispersion is good as it indicates faster growth4 after a negative shock.
Finally, I do a counterfactual analysis to see how changes in the spillover rate affect
the stationary productivity growth and its response to the negative profit shock. I find
that when the spillover rate is very low, a mild increase in it can improve stationary
productivity growth. However, increasing the spillover rate by too much causes a drop
in the stationary productivity growth. This is because mild spillover incentivizes the
leader to do more R&D to escape from competition, but too much spillover makes
innovation unprofitable for both firms. I also find that when there is an NPS, the size
of the jump in productivity growth rate is positively related to that of the increase
in productivity dispersion. This is another reason why dispersion is good during bad
times.
3See Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998).
4In my model the only engine of output growth is technological progress, thus what is said for
the productivity growth also applies to the growth of output.
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1.2 On the Quality and Timing of Innovation
The above study on the dynamics of probability dispersion is about firms’ R&D
input. However, firms do not only optimize the level of intensity of R&D, but also
choosing from R&D projects different in quality and time structure. The third chapter
of the main body of this thesis focuses on the firm’s decision on R&D projects, and
uses the event study of the 1986 U.S.-Japan semiconductor trade conflict for empirical
evidence.
Multiple reasons make the U.S.-Japan semiconductor trade conflict from 1986 to
1996 suitable for an event study to answer the above question. Firstly, the protection
was explicitly targeted at one industry – semiconductor manufacturing, thus there is
a definite boundary between the treatment group and the control group5. Secondly,
the policy change across the two regimes separated by the year 1991 is clear: the only
difference between the pre-1991 and post-1991 regimes is that the protection on U.S.
semiconductor firms during the first regime was removed during the second. Finally,
the trade conflict was settled with agreements, hence the protection was unilateral,
without any retaliation like in a trade war. This fact helps in attributing the effects
identified within the protected firms to the protectionist policy without the risk of
confusion.
Using firm-level data from the semiconductor and other U.S. manufacturing indus-
tries, the difference-in-difference (DID) regression reports a significant rise in returns
to R&D (RRD, defined as the future patent value divided by current R&D expen-
diture) of the semiconductor firms in response to the removal of protection. This
finding is robust after controlling for the returns to scale of R&D6, or controlling for
the cross-industry network effect.
5The potential cross-industry spillover effect from the treatment to control group will be controlled
as one of the robustness checks.
6For example, Faff et al. (2013), Naik (2014) and Kim et al. (2018) report diminishing returns of
R&D; Madsen (2007) supports constant returns to R&D.
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The above empirical findings suggest that the higher returns to R&D associated
with the removal of the protectionist policy was not mechanical, but was likely to
reflect changes in the quality of R&D projects adopted by the firms experiencing the
policy change. The question naturally follows as to why those U.S. semiconductor
firms would have chosen R&D projects with lower quality during the five years of
protection. To provide an explanation, I propose a theory in which firms choose
from short-term and long-term innovation projects. The short-term project realizes
faster, but reduces the unit cost of production by a lower degree; the long-term
project has a later realization, while reduces the firm’s unit cost by more. I show that
temporary protection causes some firms to switch from the long-term to the short-
term innovation project, because the incentive to take advantage of higher profitability
in the short-term when protection is in effect drives them to sacrifice the quality for
timeliness of innovation. My theory thus implies that temporary protectionist policy
leads firms to adopt short-term R&D projects with inferior quality, resulting in worse
R&D performance and lower productivity growth. The implications of my theory are
consistent with the empirical findings from the event study, and are verified by a pair
of empirical tests using parametric and non-parametric methods.
1.3 Layout
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, Section 2.1
discusses the relationship between my study and the literature. Section 2.2 identifies
the negative profit shock using data from U.S. manufacturing firms, and employs
the local projection method to obtain the impulse response functions of dispersion in
productivity as well as in R&D intensity to the NPS. Section 2.3 sets up a technology
ladder model to study the stationary behavior of R&D efforts and technology gap
under heterogeneous R&D costs. Section 2.4 introduces the negative profit shock to
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the model, and analyzes its effects on firms’ R&D efforts and the technology gap.
In Chapter 3, Section 3.1 and 3.2 structurally estimates the model parameters,
solves the model numerically, and simulates the responses of R&D and technology
gap to the NPS. Section 3.3 uses reduced-form regressions to test the proposed mech-
anism about heterogeneous R&D responses. Section 3.4 studies the dynamics of
productivity growth in response to the NPS, and conducts a counterfactual analysis
with hypothetical values of spillover rates.
Chapter 4 studies firms’ decisions on R&D projects different in quality and time
structure. Section 4.1 introduces related literature; Section 4.2 briefly reviews the
history of the U.S.-Japan semiconductor trade conflict; Section 4.3 empirically studies
the impact of protectionist policy on firms’ R&D performance; Section 4.4 proposes
a theory on the tradeoff between the quality and timing regarding innovation, and
uses it to explain the earlier empirical findings; Section 4.5 tests the implications of
my theory.
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes.
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Chapter 2
A Theory of the Dynamics of Productivity
Dispersion
I propose a new theory on the source of productivity dispersion and of its counter-
cyclical nature. In my model, it is the heterogeneity in R&D capacities (or the costs
to do R&D) that generates the non-zero expected technology gap between firms. It is
also because of such heterogeneous R&D capacities that firms’ R&D efforts respond
to negative profit shock in opposite directions, leading to a countercyclical technology
gap.
2.1 Related Literature
The above mechanism is different from those in the current literature. For ex-
ample, in Bachmann and Moscarini (2011), firms’ price experimentation during re-
cessions leads to an extended dispersion in consumer price, which can cause a larger
dispersion in measured revenue TFP. Berger and Vavra (2019) use trade shocks to
show that changing dispersion is driven by dynamics of firms’ responsiveness. This
is close to my story, but my definition of shock is more general, and my discussion
of firms’ responsiveness is particularly about their R&D activities. Kehrig (2015)
explains the countercyclical productivity dispersion by the sullying effect, i.e. low-
productivity firms are more likely to survive in recessions due to the low factor prices.
Other interpretations to the same phenomenon include the surge of entry (Foster et al.
(2019)), financing constraint and capital reallocation (Cui (2013)), and the life-cycle
9
of businesses (Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda (2013); Decker et al. (2016)).
My model also predicts higher productivity growth following negative shocks,
an empirical fact documented by Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998), Bloom, Draca and
Van Reenen (2015a) and Bloom et al. (2020). In my model, this pattern is generated
by the leading firm’s attempt to recover lost profit by improving productivity, which
dominates the following firm’s lower R&D effort through spillover. This explanation
is different from those provided by the literature, such as the exit of the least produc-
tive units (known as the cleansing effect, see Schumpeter (1942) and Caballero and
Hammour (1994)), the lower opportunity cost for R&D or upgrading (Cooper and
Haltiwanger (1993), Bloom et al. (2020)), or the better chance for the outside firms
to replace the incumbents (Canton and Uhlig (1999)) during recessions. Therefore,
productivity dispersion is good in bad times since the mechanism behind it also gen-
erates higher productivity growth. For this, productivity dispersion is not necessarily
bad for growth, as in agreement with Kehrig and Vincent (2019) and not with Hsieh
and Klenow (2009).
My counterfactual analysis considers the impact of the spillover rate on productiv-
ity growth. Using my structurally estimated model, I find that a mild spillover helps
to increase stationary productivity growth rate because it stimulates R&D races and
pushes the leader to do more innovation. This is consistent with the idea that stronger
competition is good for growth through reducing the leading firms’ slackness, as in
Hart (1983) and Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1997). However, a spillover too
high dampens the incentive for both firms to do R&D, and thus lowers the station-
ary productivity growth rate. This finding serves as a quantitative example to the
large body of literature on the optimal patent design: Nordhaus (1967), Gilbert and
Shapiro (1990) and Gallini (1992).
My theoretical model contributes to the literature of the technology ladder models
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by focusing on the behavior of the technology gap with heterogeneous R&D costs.
This class of models dates back to Segerstrom, Anant and Dinopoulos (1990), Gross-
man and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), and its recent applications
include Aghion et al. (2001), Aghion et al. (2005), Ludkovski and Sircar (2016) and
Liu, Mian and Sufi (2019). The market structure assumed in these four latest pa-
pers includes duopoly facing CES demand, Cournot duopoly, and Bertrand duopoly.
My theoretical model is abstract from a specific market structure and thus is more
general. When it comes to structural estimation, I adopt the general equilibrium
framework with CES demand.
2.2 Impulse Responses to Negative Profit Shocks
In this section, I present empirical evidence that negative shocks to firm profit have
a positive dynamic impact on dispersion in productivity and R&D intensity at the
industry level. The data are from publicly listed manufacturing firms in the U.S., and
the outcome is robust to different measures of dispersion. The empirical findings in
this section motivate my theory explaining the countercyclical productivity dispersion
through the lens of firms’ heterogeneous R&D responses to the negative profit shock.
2.2.1 Identifying Negative Profit Shocks
In this thesis, the negative profit shock (NPS) refers to the event that aggregated
profit at the industry-year level falls below a certain threshold. For the nature of my
research questions, I’m not interested in the cause of such shocks, as long as they are
exogenous to the firms involved. This is why I identify the NPS at the industry level
rather than at the firm level.
Data
I obtain data on firm fundamentals from the CRSP/Compustat Merged Database,
which provides firm-year observations on output, capital, employment, gross profit,
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and R&D expenditure. The first three variables are used to estimated revenue total
factor productivity (TFPR, or interchangeably TFP in this thesis) by the cost-share-
based method. To do so, it requires information about the labor share of output,
which is in turn provided by the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database at the
industry-year level. Finally, when it comes to the estimation of model parameters, I
need data on the value of firm innovation. For this, I resort to the dataset constructed
by Kogan et al. (2017), where the economic value of each patent granted to the U.S.
listed firms is measured by the response from the stock market in a short time window
following the issuance of the patent. The patent values are then aggregated to reflect
the firm-year value of innovations.
Merging the above three databases yields an unbalanced panel ranging annually
from 1970 to 2010, covering 4,074 U.S. manufacturing firms from 135 industries de-
fined by the 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. The details on
the description and pre-processing of the data are left in the appendix.
Negative Profit Shocks
The CRSP/Compustat Merged Database records annual gross profit1 at the firm
level. I scale it by firm total assets to get rid of the influence from inflation or firm
growth and denote this scaled gross profit by 6?8, 9 ,C , where subscripts 8, 9 and C are
indicators for firm, industry, and year, respectively. I remove the trend in scaled gross
profit by regressing it on the year fixed effect and the industry-specific linear trend:
6?8, 9 ,C = U + XC + X 9 × C + D8, 9 ,C , (2.1)
where XC and X 9 are the year and industry fixed effects, and D the error term. The
residual from the above regression, 6?res, is orthogonal to the year fixed effect as well
as to the industry-specific linear trend, and is thus used as the detrended firm-year
1According to the U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) Definition, the gross
profit is sale minus the cost of goods sold.
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scaled profit.
I then aggregate the above detrended scaled profit to the industry-year level,
denote it by 6?res
9 ,C
, and calculate for its 5th percentile, pct5(6?res), over all industry-
year cells. The negative profit shock is defined as the event that an industry-year
observation of 6?res
9 ,C
falls below this percentile2. And such events are marked by the
dummy variable #%( for negative profit shock in the following way:
#%( 9 ,C =

1 if 6?res9 ,C < pct5(6?res);
0 otherwise.
(2.2)
The dummy #%( is so constructed that it assumes value 1 if and only if there is a
negative profit shock on the corresponding industry-year cell.
2.2.2 Impulse Responses of Productivity Dispersion to NPS
I employ the local projection method (Jordà (2005)) to study the dynamic impact
of negative profit shocks on the industry-level productivity dispersion3. This method
regresses the variable of interest at different time horizons on an exogenous shock, and
collects the distributed coefficients on the shock. Their layout on the time horizon
provides an estimate of the impulse response function (IRF) of the variable of interest
to the shock. Here, the variable of interest is the measure of dispersion in productiv-
ity4 at the industry level, and the shock is the NPS. The regression specification is as
2Using extreme values to define events is a common practice in the study of sovereign debt crises
(See Aguiar et al. (2016)). Acemoglu, Akcigit and Celik (2014) and Celik and Tian (2020) use
tail distribution of patent citations to define disruptive innovation; Chen and Ming (2020) use tail
innovation values to define major innovation.
3Jordà (2005) identifies shocks first by regressing variable of interest H at time C + ℎ on lagged
values of H. Since I identify the shocks directly, the specifications here are in line with those as in
Ramey (2016).
4Firm-year TFP is estimated using cost-share based method, to which a recent detailed treatment
is Foster et al. (2017). Details on the methodology are left in the appendix.
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follows:
38B?TFP9 ,C+ℎ = U
ℎ
9 + XℎC + Vℎ#%( 9 ,C + ,ℎ^ 9 ,C + Dℎ9,C . (2.3)
In the above expressions, 38B?TFP
9 ,C+ℎ is industry-level productivity dispersion, which
is going to be measured by three standard approaches: the interquartile range of
log TFP, the difference between the 90th and 10th percentiles of log TFP, and the
standard deviation of log TFP. On the right hand side, U 9 and XC are the industry and
year fixed effects, respectively; #%( 9 ,C is the negative profit shock indicator defined in
(2.2). ^ 9 ,C is the industry-year level set of control variables. It includes the number







captures the dynamic impact of NPS on within-industry
productivity dispersion from the current year to ten years later. The figure below plots
the estimated V̂ℎ with ℎ = −5, · · · , 0, · · · , 10. The negative ℎ’s are for the placebo test
to see if the dependent variable responds to the shock even before the shock occurs.




















Figure 2·1: Impulse responses of industry-level productivity disper-
sion to the NPS
The three panels correspond to three separate local projection regressions using different
measures of industry-level productivity dispersions. Industry-year observations with
firm number less than 2 are dropped. Shaded areas are 90% confidence bands. I use the
5The HHI is a standard index to measure the degree of within-industry concentration, defined





)2, where <B is the market share in percentage. For details, see Herfindahl
(1950) and Hirschman (1945).
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Driscoll-Kraay standard errors6 which is robust to heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation
and cross-sectional dependence7.
Figure 2·1 suggests that the negative profit shock is responsible for the expansion
in productivity dispersion at the industry level. Dependent on the measure, the size
of such expansion varies from 10 to 40 percent in the year of the shock. The 10-
90 percentiles approach reports the highest response of productivity dispersion to
the NPS, while the interquartile range reports the lowest. This happens when the
expansion is driven by the spreading-out of the extreme values.
The positive pre-trend in the IRFs of productivity dispersion may be due to the
way the negative profit shock is defined. The NPS is defined by a cutoff value,
which means if the shock accumulates through time rather than happens with an
instantaneous slump, the milder drop in profit before hitting the 5th percentile cutoff
can cause the movement in productivity dispersion prior to the detection of the NPS.
So is a potential explanation for the pre-trend.
2.2.3 Impulse Responses of R&D Dispersion to NPS
What is the driving force of the countercyclical productivity dispersion as shown
in Figure 2·1? There may be multiple answers, and the one this thesis proposes is
the heterogeneous R&D responses to the negative profit shock. The preference of
this explanation over the others is based on my following empirical finding. In local
projection regression 2.3, I replace the dispersion in productivity 38B?TFP by the
dispersion in the natural logarithm of R&D intensity (RDI)8, 38B?RDI, and find the
impulse response functions as in the figure below.
The three panels correspond to three separate local projection regressions using different
measures of industry-level dispersions in R&D intensity. Industry-year observations
with firm number less than 2 are dropped. Shaded areas are 90% confidence bands
using the Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.
6See Driscoll and Kraay (1998).
7See Hoechle (2006).
8A firm’s R&D intensity is its R&D expenditure divided by sale.
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Figure 2·2: Impulse responses of industry-level RDI dispersion to the
NPS
Like productivity dispersion, the dispersion in R&D activities also responds pos-
itively to the NPS at the industry level, as shown with all three different measures.
The pre-trend may be explained in the same way as that found in Figure 2·1, which
is the gradual accumulation in the negative profit shock.
The high resemblance between the IRFs of the productivity dispersion and RDI
dispersion suggests that the former may be driven by the latter, i.e. negative profit
shocks enlarge productivity dispersion through the divergence of R&D activities.
To verify the above conjecture, I build a theoretical model where two firms engage
in the R&D races. In Section Section 2.3, I will show how their R&D strategies
determine the gap between their technology levels in the equilibrium. Then, in Section
2.4, I shall introduce the negative profit shock to the model and see how the firms’
R&D efforts and technology gap respond to the shock. In Section 3.2, my quantitative
model with structurally estimated parameters reproduces the conjectured pattern: in
response to the NPS, the two firms adjust their R&D efforts in opposite directions,
leading to a higher technology gap.
2.3 Technology Ladder and Heterogeneous Climbers
In this section, I introduce a dynamic model of R&D races on a duopolistic mar-
ket where firms’ R&D strategies endogenously generate technological progress and
technology gap in the stationary equilibrium. In the next section, I will extend the
model to study firms’ responses in R&D to the negative profit shock, and how they
affect the technology gap.
My model is closely related to Aghion et al. (2001), Aghion et al. (2005) and
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Ludkovski and Sircar (2016) where assumptions regarding the market structure are
different, but all are examples of the technology ladder models9. The major con-
tribution of my more generalized model is twofold: firstly, I assume heterogeneous
R&D capacities among firms, and thus study the behavior of technology gap in the
stationary equilibrium; secondly, I study the impact of the negative profit shock on
firms’ R&D efforts and the technology gap.
2.3.1 Model Setup
Technology and Profit
Two firms, indexed by 5 ∈ {, }, consist a duopolistic industry. Time is contin-
uous: C ∈ [0,∞). At every instant of time C, firm 5 ’s profit flow c 5 (C) depends on
the locations of the two firms on a technology ladder with countably infinite steps:
n(C) = (= (C), = (C)) ∈ N2+. The higher = 5 (C), the more advanced in technology firm
5 is. The relationship between firms’ profit and their positions on the ladder are
assumed to be as follows:
Assumption 1 The profit function c 5 (n(C)), 5 ∈ {, } has the following proper-
ties:
1. Time-invariancy: for any ñ ∈ N2+, and any B, C ∈ [0,∞), c 5 (n(B) = ñ) =
c 5 (n(C) = ñ).
2. Monotonicity: c 5 (n) is strictly increasing in the technology gap Δ= 5 B = 5 − =− 5 .
3. Symmetry: for any =1, =2 ∈ N+, c (=1, =2) = c (=2, =1).
Under these assumptions, the profit flow of either firm is uniquely determined
by the current technology gap, regardless of time, the absolute number of steps,
or firm label; whoever holding a certain relative leading position on the technology
ladder earns the same profit. This feature allows me to reduce the strategy space
from uncountably infinite, as dependent on the continuous time, to finite as on the
technology gap. How this is done will be shown in detail in Lemma 1.
Among recent literature employing the technology ladder models, Aghion et al.
(2001) assumes demands faced by the two firms are induced by constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) production function; Aghion et al. (2005) studies a similar problem
in a Bertrand duopolistic market; in Ludkovski and Sircar (2016) there is Cournot
competition. Under the first two of them, the profit function satisfies Assumption 1.
9Also known as the quality ladder as in Grossman and Helpman (1991).
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In Ludkovski and Sircar (2016) the profit depends on the levels of technology rather
than their gap, thus the second item in 1 doesn’t hold.
Innovation
Firms exert R&D efforts to climb upwards along the technology ladder, to leave
the laggard (or follower) farther behind or to catch up with the leader. Either way,
an arrival of innovation increases the firm’s technology gap relative to its rival, and
grants it higher profit flows.
When an innovation arrives, the innovator moves one step ahead along the technol-
ogy ladder. The occurrence of innovations is stochastic: for each firm 5 , the location
it is on the technology ladder is a random variable governed by a Poisson counting
process
{
# 5 (C); C > 0
}
. Steps # 5 (C) and #− 5 (C) are independent at any C > 0, unless
in the special case where the absolute value of the technology gap, |# 5 (C) − #− 5 (C) |,
equals its upper bound. What’s different there will soon be elaborated.
At any time C, the Poisson arrival rate for firm 5 is _ 5 (C) = _0 5 (C) + ℎ ·1{Δ= 5 < 0}
where 0 5 (C) ≥ 0 is the R&D effort chosen by firm 5 . The parameter ℎ controls the rate
of imitation10 of the follower: it has a fixed positive rate to move one step ahead by
imitating the leader, and that rate is independent of its own R&D effort. Therefore,
at time C, the conditional probability mass function (PMF) of firm 5 ’s count of coming
successful innovation, or its advancement along the technology ladder by some future
instant B > C, is11
P
{















, : = 0, 1, 2, · · · .
(2.4)
Can the technology gap between two competing firms be infinitely large? It would
be unimaginable in reality. For example, the horse-drawn vehicles and automobiles
were once close competitors as means of transportation, today they are no longer
deemed to be on the same market. In this spirit I assume that there is an upper bound
< ∈ N+ of technology gap Δ= 5 for 5 ∈ {, }. If the leader is at this maximum gap
when an innovation arrives, the follower will also jump a step upwards automatically
and simultaneously, so that the gap remains to be <, and shall never exceed it12.
10Some authors use the name "spillover" instead of "imitation" to refer the same phenomenon in
which the follower automatically advances in technology.
11See Gallager (1995), Chapter 2, page 43, Theorem 2.
12In Aghion et al. (2001), the maximum technology gap (called the lead size in their paper) is
implicitly determined by the restriction on stationary distribution. In Aghion et al. (2005), it is set
to be 1. In Ludkovski and Sircar (2016), the largest gap possible is pinned down by the fact firms
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Therefore, the leader has no incentive to do any R&D when the maximum gap is
reached. The automatic catch-up at the maximum gap can be understood with two
scenarios. First, there is a spillover from expired patents where the learning of old-
fashioned technologies by the laggard imposes no concerns to the far-reaching leader.
In the second instance, the laggard firm is so dropped behind that it is replaced by an
outsider who is just one step ahead of it when the leader succeeds in innovating. As
a result, the space for technology gap Δ= (C) B = (C) − = (C)13 is finite, and denoted
by M B [−<,−< + 1, · · · ,−1, 0, 1, · · · , < − 1, <].





satisfies the following properties:
Assumption 2 For any 5 ∈ {, }, and 0 5 ≥ 0, the R&D cost function k 5 (0 5 )
satisfies:
1. k 5 (0) = 0;
2. k 5 is second-order differentiable;
3. k 5 is strictly increasing;
4. k 5 is strictly convex.
These assumptions are standard as regards cost functions. Assumption 2.1 means
there is no fixed cost to do R&D; Assumption 2.4 ensures that the marginal cost of
R&D is strictly increasing.
Strategy and Payoff
A strategy profile in this R&D racing game is (a(C))C≥0 = (0 (C), 0 (C))C≥0 ∈
R2++ × [0,∞) that fully specifies each firm’s R&D effort at any instant. For an arbi-
trary strategy profile, firm 5 ’s expected discounted sum of net profit flow, also called












n(0), (a(C))C≥0 , (2.5)
where d > 0 is the discount factor. The expectation is taken over the stochastic
process (T(C))C≥0 = (# (C), # (C))C≥0, whose realization (n(C))C≥0 = (= (C), = (C))C≥0
pins down the path of the steps of the two firms on the technology ladder. The
stop doing R&D at some point due to the strictly positive marginal cost of R&D.
13Similarly, the technology gap from the standpoint of firm  is Δ= (C) B = (C) −=(C) = −Δ=(C).
For the ease and clarity of discussion, in the rest of this thesis, I refer to "technology gap" as Δ=(C)
from firm A’s view, unless otherwise specified.
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evolution of T(C) is governed by PMF (2.4) and the R&D strategy profile (a(C))C≥0
that determines the arrival rates of innovations.
Given the strategy played by its competitor, firm 5 chooses its own strategy to

























The performance measure and the value function, expressed as the discounted sum
of net profit flows, have clear economic intuition. However, the game in this form is
untractable. In the following equilibrium analysis, I will simplify this game through
a transformation into a finite-state equivalent.
Equilibrium Concepts
In this dynamic stochastic game, the Nash equilibrium (NE) is a strategy profile
from which no player has the incentive to deviate:































depends solely on the state of technology gap Δ=− 5 (C) = =− 5 (C) − = 5 (C),
then firm 5 ’s strategy in the NE must also be Markovian:
Lemma 1 In any Nash equilibrium, for any 5 ∈ {, }, suppose B ≥ 0 and C ≥ 0
satisfy B ≠ C and Δ=− 5 (B) = Δ=− 5 (C). If 0∗− 5 (B) = 0
∗









Proof. Fix an arbitrary time B ≥ 0, and let C be such that Δ= 5 (B) = Δ= 5 (C)
and B ≠ C. Since firm − 5 plays a Δ=− 5 -dependent strategy, by Assumption
1 and performance measure (2.5), firm 5 faces the same optimization prob-
lem. Thus by the strict convexity of R&D cost function, it implies that the set{





has zero measure, and it must be empty set
if 0∗
5
(C) is right-continuous. 
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The restriction on right-continuous strategies14 is to exclude the case where there
are discontinuity points of the first kind in the time paths of R&D efforts, which is
mathematically possible but of no economic interest.
Lemma 1 says if in the NE, one firm plays strategy contingent on its technology
gap, the other must do the same15. Using this property, I reduce the strategy space
from an uncountably infinite set (of continuous time) to a finite set (of technology
gap). In the remainder of this thesis, most of the discussions will be based on the
latter approach, except for a few cases in which the time-path interpretation is more
convenient for analytical purposes.
The above reduction in dimension of the strategy space leads to the second equi-
librium concept, the Markov sub-game perfect equilibrium (MPE). The following
definition is in line with the equilibrium concept developed by Tirole (1988) and
Maskin and Tirole (2001)16.







Δ==−Δ=∈M, where given 0
∗




solution to firm 5 ’s optimization problem:
sup


















Δ= 5 (0), {a(Δ= 5 )} .
(2.7)
In the remainder of this thesis, for analytical tractability as well as numerical
computability, I shall restrict my discussions to the MPE.
2.3.2 Existence of the Markov Perfect Equilibrium
I have shown how the infinite-horizon game can be transformed to a finite-state
equivalent, in this subsection I focus on the existence and characterization of the
MPE. Denote by random variable / the time interval between the current instance
and the next arrival of innovation from either firm  or ; by / 5 the firm-specific
arriving time. Due to the memoryless property of the Poisson PMF (2.4), the value












15Since Δ= 5 = −Δ=− 5 , to say firm 5 ’s strategy is Δ=− 5 -contingent is equivalent to saying that it
is Δ= 5 -contingent.
16For a textbook treatment and more examples, see Miao (2014).
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c 5 (Δ= 5 ) − k 5
(
0∗5 (Δ= 5 )
)]
3C
+ 4−d/1{/ = / 5 }E 5
(
Δ= 5 + 1
)
+ 4−d/1{/ = /− 5 }E 5
(
Δ= 5 − 1
) }
, (2.8)
where the event {/ = / 5 } means that the next innovation is achieved by firm 5 .
The above stochastic Bellman equation can be further simplified by removing the
expectation operator, as is done with the following proposition. This proposition also
shows the existence of MPE by applying Kakutani’s Fixed-Point Theorem, the details
of the proof are left in the appendix.
Proposition 1 A Markov sub-game perfect equilibrium 0∗
5
(Δ= 5 ) for 5 ∈ {, } and
Δ= 5 = −Δ=− 5 ∈ M exists, and is the solution to the following optimization problem:
E 5 (Δ= 5 ) = sup
0 5 ≥0
1
_(0 5 + 0∗− 5 ) + ℎ · 1{Δ= 5 ≠ 0} + d
{
c 5 (Δ= 5 ) − k(0 5 )
+ (_0 5 + ℎ · 1{Δ= 5 < 0})E 5 (Δ= 5 + 1)
+ (_0∗− 5 + ℎ · 1{Δ= 5 > 0})E 5 (Δ= 5 − 1)
}
(2.9)
for all Δ= 5 < <, with boundary conditions
0∗5 (<) =0; (2.10)
E 5 (<) =
1
_0∗− 5 + ℎ + d
{




In the above, 0∗
5
and E 5 are the policy function and value function in the MPE.
Equation (2.9) shows the state-contingent value function transformed from (2.7); and
the boundary conditions are from the fact that the leading firm, at the maximal
technology gap, has no incentive to do R&D. This is because it gains nothing from
innovation due to the automatic catching up by its competitor.
The first-order condition of (2.9) with respect to the R&D effort implicitly deter-
mines the policy function 0∗
5
. Substitute it back to the value function, and the game
is characterized by the following system of non-linear equations. This is later used to
find the numerical solution of the model.
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Corollary 1 The value funtions E 5 (Δ= 5 ) and policy functions 0∗5 (Δ= 5 ) for 5 ∈ {, }
are solutions to the system of equations:






(Δ= 5 ) + 0∗− 5 (−Δ= 5 )
]
+ ℎ · 1{Δ= 5 ≠ 0} + d
{
c 5 (Δ= 5 )
− k 5
(




_0∗5 (Δ= 5 ) + ℎ · 1{Δ= 5 < 0}
]
E 5 (Δ= 5 + 1)
+
[
_0∗− 5 (−Δ= 5 ) + ℎ · 1{Δ= 5 > 0}
]
E 5 (Δ= 5 − 1)
}











E 5 (Δ= 5 + 1) − E 5 (Δ= 5 )
]
, if Δ= 5 < <;
(2.13)
0∗5 (<) =0; (2.14)
E 5 (<) =
1
_0∗− 5 + ℎ + d
{
c 5 (<) + (_0∗− 5 + ℎ)E 5 (< − 1)
}
. (2.15)
Proof. This is directly from Proposition 1, with first-order conditions with respect to
the R&D efforts. 
Equation (2.13) conveys a clear message on how the equilibrium R&D efforts are
determined: the marginal cost of R&D should be equal to the increment of firm value
from innovation, scaled by the marginal contribution of R&D effort to the arrival rate
of innovation, _. Since the R&D cost function is strictly convex, the intuition is that
if the firm value increases more from innovation, or if the next innovation is expected
to arrive sooner, then the firm should exert higher R&D effort.
In the system in Corollary 1, there are (8<−4) unknowns17, and the same number
of equations. By Proposition 1, the MPE exists, thus so does the solution to this
system.
2.3.3 Stationary Distribution of the Technology Gap
This subsection studies the limiting behavior (as C → ∞) of the technol-
ogy gap in the MPE. Notice that the state space of gap Δ=, M = {−<,−< +
1, · · · ,−1, 0, 1, · · · , < − 1, <}, has 2< + 1 components. Let M8 be the 8th compo-
nent in M, 8 = 1, · · · , 2< + 1. The transition rate of the process (Δ# (C))C≥0 from




, E and E.
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(M8) + ℎ · 1{M8 < 0}, if 9 = 8 + 1;
_0∗

(−M8) + ℎ · 1{M8 > 0}, if 9 = 8 − 1.
(2.16)
When |8 − 9 | = 1, the arrving time / 5 of innovation by firm 5 , as mentioned in
value function (2.8), follows an exponential distribution with rate @8, 9 . It means that
between two successive jumps of process (Δ# (C))C≥0, toM8 andM 9 respectively, the
expected time it takes in the MPE is 1/@8, 9 . Similarly, the rate with which (Δ# (C))C≥0
leaves its current stateM8 is @8 B @8,8+1 + @8,8−1, a property of the sum of independent
Poisson processes.
Now define the transition rate matrix & to be a square matrix of dimension (2< +
1) × (2< +1), whose components @8, 9 satisfy (2.16) if |8− 9 | = 1; @8, 9 = −@8 if |8− 9 | = 0;
and @8, 9 = 0 if |8− 9 | > 1. The last case is because it is impossible for the technology gap
to jumps with size greater than one. The figure below is a graphical representation
of the &-matrix.
−m −m+ 1 · · · −1 0 1 · · · m− 1 m
λa∗A(−m) + h λa∗A(−1) + h λa∗A(0) λa∗A(m− 1)
λa∗B(−m) + hλa∗B(−1) + hλa∗B(0)λa∗B(m− 1)
Figure 2·3: Transition rates across states of technology gap
In this way, the &-matrix governs the jump process of the technology gap, from
which the distribution of the time between two jumps onto certain states can be
inferred. However, the &-matrix is unclear on the probability distribution over the
new states when there is a jump. For this purpose, another matrix is in need, and it
can be derived from the &-matrix.
When the technology gap jumps, the probability over where it heads is given by
the jump matrix %. One way to construct it is through the entries of the &-matrix:
Definition 3 The jump matrix % is defined as follows:
% =
(







−@8, 9/@8,8, if 8 ≠ 9 , @88 ≠ 0;




0, if @88 ≠ 0;
1, otherwise.
(2.19)
Just like with discrete-time Markov chains, the stationary distribution `(<), < ∈ M
is defined by the invariance under multiplication by the %-matrix:
Definition 4 A 1× (2< + 1) vector ` is a stationary distribution over state spaceM
if and only if:





The stationary distribution ` has its name from the invariance property. It is also
called the limiting distribution for the fact18:
`(<) = lim
C→∞
P(Δ# (C) = <), ∀< ∈ M . (2.20)
From this equation, when time C is sufficiently large, the probability that the technol-
ogy gap Δ# (C) assumes a certain value < doesn’t depend on the initial gap Δ= (0).
And so the limiting distribution ` characterizes the long-term behavior of the tech-
nology gap. In the rest of the thesis, when calculating moments of variables in the
MPE, I use this limiting distribution. And I will use the terms "stationary" and
"limiting" interchangeably according to which fits the context better.
For a jump matrix %, if the associated Markov chain is irreducible and recurrent,
then the stationary distribution ` in Definition 4 exists and is unique. From Figure
2·3 it is obvious that these conditions are met. Moreover, the stationary distribution
can be explicitly expressed using the transition rate matrix &:
Proposition 2 In the MPE, the stationary distribution ` of technology gap
(Δ# (C))C≥0 exists and is unique. Specifically, `(<) = −b8@8,8, where < = M8 and
b8 is the 8-th component of the solution to b& = 0.
18See Theorem 5.11 in Cinlar (1975).
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Proof. See Theorems 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 in Norris (1998)19. 





Δ= 5 ∈M , the stationary distribution can be calculated through ei-
ther Definition 4 or Proposition 2.
2.3.4 Expected Technology Gap under Limiting Distribution
This subsection explores the expected technology gap under the limiting distribu-
tion. I contrast two cases: in one the R&D costs of the two firms are identical; in the
other, firm ’s marginal R&D cost is pointwise lower than that of firm . For the
first case, the following result is obvious, but necessary as a baseline.
Proposition 3 If k (0) = k (0) for all 0 ≥ 0, then lim
C→∞
E [Δ# (C)] = 0.
Proof. This is from the symmetry of the game, details are left in the Appendix.
If two firms face the same cost function of R&D, the expected technology gap
under the limiting distribution is zero. This is not surprising since the firms are
identical in every aspect, so are their strategies, and hence there is no reason for one
to be the leader in the long term.
The more interesting case is where firms have heterogeneous R&D costs. Without
loss of generality, let firm  be more efficient in R&D than firm . Particularly,
assume the marginal R&D cost of firm  is strictly lower than that of firm  at
all R&D effort levels. With its supremacy in R&D capacity, firm ’s value function







for all 0 > 0, then for any < ∈ M, E (<) > E (<).
Proof. See Appendix.
The low-cost firm is not necessarily more R&D intensive at every state. However,
in the simple case where the maximum technology gap is one, it is true that firm ’s
R&D effort dominates firm ’s at all states.












for all 0 > 0; and
(2) The discount factor d and the arrival rate multiplier _ are sufficiently small.
19These theorems are about the existence and uniqueness of the invariant measure, between which
and the limiting distribution there is a one-to-one mapping.
26
Proof. See Appendix.
Naturally, the difference in R&D efforts leads to asymmetric probability masses
on state space M under the limiting distribution.
Proposition 4 In the case < = 1, under the conditions in Lemma 3, in the limiting
distribution, the probability mass function of technology gap satisfies `(1) > `(−1).

















































(−1) + ℎ > 1. (2.22)














Intuitively, if the marginal R&D cost of one firm is pointwise lower than the
other’s, then under the limiting distribution, the low-cost firm has a larger chance of
being the leader (`(1)) than does its rival (`(−1)). Its implication on the technology
gap is straightforward:
Corollary 2 In the case < = 1, under the conditions in Lemma 3, lim
C→∞
E [Δ= (C)] >
0.
Proof. This follows from Proposition 4.
With heterogeneous R&D costs, the expected technology gap is non-zero. Due to
the complexity of the non-linear system, this statement is proved under the simple
case where the maximum gap is one. Meanwhile, parameter restriction in Lemma 3
results from the lack of analytical expressions of equilibrium R&D efforts and firm
values. When it comes to numerical experiments in later sections, Proposition 4 and
Corollary 2 hold with arbitrary sets of < > 1 and other parameters values.
2.4 Extended Model with the Negative Profit Shock
In the previous model, the only state variable is the technology gap, whose ex-
pected value under the limiting distribution depends on the R&D cost functions of
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the two firms. In this section, I extend this baseline model to incorporate the negative
profit shock and examine its impact on R&D efforts and the technology gap.
2.4.1 Modelling the Shock
The negative profit shock is exogenous and unanticipated. When it happens, it
lowers both firms’ profit. This punishment on the whole industry can be alleviated
through innovation by the industrial leader.
To bring the above idea to the technology ladder model, suppose that there is a
technology frontier. Without the shock, the frontier is just the technology level of the
leading firm; in other words, the distance of the leader to the frontier is zero. The
shock works by pushing the two firms back from the technology frontier simultane-
ously by  > 0 steps, and lowering their maximized profit according to the degree
of shock . This doesn’t mean that the firms have lost their knowledge, but only
reflects that due to the negative profit shock, the firms need higher productivity to
recover the pre-shock level of profit.
Denote firm  and ’s distances to the technology frontier on the technology
ladder by 3 and 3. For either firm 5 ∈ {, }, 3 5 ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · }, where 3 5 = 0
means that firm 5 is on the technology frontier. Therefore, min{3, 3} = 0 if and
only if there is currently no shock. It is equivalent to saying that min{3, 3} > 0 if
and only if there has been a shock from which the two firms have yet to recover.
Profit Function
When there is no shock, i.e. min{3, 3} = 0, the profit function and the whole
game reduce to those seen in the previous section20. When the shock happens, both
3 and 3 increase by their degree  > 0 instantly. Hence the shock doesn’t change
the relative positions of the firms along the technology ladder. With all the above,
the new profit function reflecting the negative profit shock is assumed to have the
following property:
Assumption 3 Given distances to technology frontier 3 5 and 3− 5 , the profit of firm
5 is
c̃ 5 (3 5 , 3− 5 ) = (1 − Xmin{3 5 , 3− 5 })c(3− 5 − 3 5 ), (2.23)
where X ∈ (0, 1), function c satisfies Assumption 1.
20To see that the baseline model is a special case, note that the technology gap Δ= 5 is the difference
between the distances, 3− 5 − 3 5
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The parameter X controls the severity of one degree of shock. It also defines the
upper bound of the magnitude of shock, which is the largest integer such that the
profit remains non-negative:  = max{= ∈ N : X= ≤ 1}. The distance of one firm
from the technology frontier can thus never exceeds  + <, the sum of the upper
bounds of shock and the technology gap.
Negative Profit Shock
The arrival of the NPS is unanticipated by the firms, neither is it taken into
consideration when firms form their strategies. Formally, by the occurrence of the
shock, I mean the following:
Definition 5 A negative profit shock with degree  ∈ {1, · · · , } occurs at time C if
and only if:
(1) There exists some g > 0 such that for any B ∈ (C − g, C), min{3 (B), 3 (B)} = 0;
and
(2) For 5 = , , 3 5 (C) − lim
B→C−
3 5 (B) = .
Transition of States
Since the state space is now two-dimensional, the evolvement of state (3, 3) is
more complex than in the baseline model. The exhaustive discussion of all possible
transisions after an arrival of innovation is as follows:
Case 1: 3 5 (C) = 3− 5 (C) = 0. There is no shock and the two firms are neck-to-neck
on the technology frontier. If the next innovation is made by firm 5 at time B, then
3 5 (B) = 0 and 3− 5 (B) = 1, meaning that it becomes the leader and still on the frontier.
Case 2: 3 5 (C) = 0 and 0 < 3− 5 (C) < <. There is no shock and firm 5 is the
leader. If the next innovation is done by the leader at time B, then 3 5 (B) = 0 and
3− 5 (B) = 3− 5 (C)+1; if it is the laggard who innovates, 3 5 (B) = 0 and 3− 5 (B) = 3− 5 (C)−1.
Case 3: 3 5 (C) = 0 and 3− 5 (C) = < > 0. The only difference from case 2 is that now
the leader 5 has no incentive to do R&D, just like in the baseline model. Therefore,
the next innovation must be from the follower − 5 .
Case 4: 3 5 (C) > 0 and 3− 5 (C) > 0. There has been a shock at least as late as
time C. If the next innovation is from firm 5 at time B, then 3 5 (B) = 3 5 (C) − 1.
For the other firm − 5 , if 3− 5 (C) = 3 5 (C) + <, then 3− 5 (B) = 3− 5 (C) − 1 out of the
automatic catching up at the maximum technology gap; otherwise it remains where
it was: 3− 5 (B) = 3− 5 (C).
To formalize the above rules of transition, for fixed 5 ∈ {, }, let
(
3 5 (C), 3− 5 (C)
)
be the state at time C. Suppose the next innovation arrives at time B > C, and is done
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by firm 5 ′ ∈ { 5 ,− 5 }21, the new state
(
3 5 (B), 3− 5 (B)
)
is given by the transition rule )
as a function of
(










3 5 , 3− 5 + 1
)
, if 5 ′ = 5 ∧ 3 5 = 0 ∧ 0 ≤ 3− 5 < <;(
3 5 − 1, 3− 5
)
, if 5 ′ = 5 ∧ 3 5 > 0 ∧ 3 5 − 3− 5 > −<;(
3 5 − 1, 3− 5 − 1
)
, if 5 ′ = 5 ∧ 3 5 > 0 ∧ 3 5 − 3− 5 = −<;(
3 5 + 1, 3− 5
)
, if 5 ′ = − 5 ∧ 3− 5 = 0 ∧ 0 ≤ 3 5 < <;(
3 5 , 3− 5 − 1
)
, if 5 ′ = − 5 ∧ 3− 5 > 0 ∧ 3− 5 − 3 5 > −<;(
3 5 − 1, 3− 5 − 1
)
, if 5 ′ = − 5 ∧ 3− 5 > 0 ∧ 3− 5 − 3 5 = −<.
(2.24)
In this way, the updating rule ) returns the updated state upon the arrival of inno-
vation depending on the current state and who the innovator is.
As in the baseline model, I allow for the imitation effect, with which the gap
between the two firms shrinks by one step at a fixed rate ℎ ≥ 0 regardless of firms’
R&D efforts.
2.4.2 Analysis of Equilibrium
In the extended model, given the initial distances to the technology frontier(
3 5 (0), 3− 5 (0)
)
and any arbitrary strategy profile
(
0 5 (C), 0− 5 (C)
)
C≥0 specifying the
time paths of R&D efforts of both firms from the beginning to infinity, the perfor-
mance measure of firm 5 is, similar to its counterpart in the baseline model (2.5), the
expected discounted sum of its net profit flow:
J5
(
3 5 (0), 3− 5 (0)





















(C) |3 (0), 3 (0)
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(C) |3 (0), 3 (0)
)
C≥0
maximizes its performance measure:











3 5 (0), 3− 5 (0)




As in the baseline model, the state space of the extended model can be reduced
from uncountable infinity in time to a finite subset of the two firms’ distances to the
technology frontier (3, 3). Again, I will restrict the discussion on equilibrium to
the Markov Perfect Equilibrium, in which the state-dependent equilibrium value of
performance measure of firm 5 is characterized by its value function E 5 (3 5 , 3− 5 ), and
its equilibrium strategy the policy function 0∗
5
(3 5 , 3− 5 ).
The argument for the existence of a Perfect Markov Equilibrium in the extended
model is similar to that for the baseline model given by Proposition 1, only with an
additional state variable. The proposition below lays out the system of equations to
which the value functions E 5 and policy functions 0∗5 consist a solution:
Proposition 5 There exists a Perfect Markov Equilibrium 0∗
5
(3 5 , 3− 5 ) for 5 ∈ {, },
where (3 5 , 3− 5 ) ∈ {0, · · · ,  +<}2, min{3 5 , 3− 5 } ≤  and |3 5 − 3− 5 | ≤ <. Moreover,
the equilibrium strategy profile satisfies the following system of equations:






(3 5 , 3− 5 ) + 0∗− 5 (3− 5 , 3 5 )
]
+ ℎ · 1{3 5 ≠ 3− 5 } + d
{
c̃ 5 (3 5 , 3− 5 ) − k 5
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) (3 5 , 3− 5 | 5 )
)
− E 5 (3 5 , 3− 5 )
]
(2.28)
0∗5 (0, <) =0 (2.29)
The proof of the above proposition is skipped, as it acquires nothing more than a
trivial modification of that of Proposition 1.
Due to the lack of an explicit expression of the firm value function, it is difficult
to analytically characterize the impact of the shock. However, it can be shown that
with a fixed technology gap between the two firms, a step farther from the technology
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frontier always means lower value for either firm.
Lemma 4 For all 5 ∈ {, } and (3 5 , 3− 5 ) ∈ N2+, E 5 (3 5 , 3− 5 ) > E 5 (3 5 + 1, 3− 5 + 1)
if and only if E 5 is defined at (3 5 , 3− 5 ) and (3 5 + 1, 3− 5 + 1).
Proof. See Appendix.
Corollary 3 For all 5 ∈ {, } and (3 5 , 3− 5 ) ∈ N2+, E 5 (3 5 + 1, 3− 5 ) < E 5 (3 5 , 3− 5 ) <
E 5 (3 5 , 3− 5 + 1) if and only if E 5 is defined at all of these states.
The proof of Corollary 3 is similar to that of Lemma 4.
Directly from Lemma 4, the NPS lowers the values of both firms, and the severity
of such harm is increasing in the degree of shock :
Proposition 6 If there is a negative profit shock at time C > 0, for all 5 ∈
{, }, E 5
(

















3 5 (C), 3− 5 (C)
)
is strictly increasing in the degree of shock,  ∈ {1, · · · , }.
Proposition 6 shows that the negative profit shock lowers the firm value, and that
the magnitude of loss in firm value is increasing the degree of the shock. As a caveat,
empirically, it is difficult to distinguish between the degree of shock, , from the
effect of one unit of shock X, as in the profit function (2.23).
2.4.3 Responses of R&D to the Negative Profit Shock
In this subsection I employ the extended model to study firms’ responses in R&D
efforts to the NPS, especially to see if there is heterogeneity in the directions of
such responses. This is interesting because it helps to understand the mechanism
generating countercyclical dispersion in RDI as well as in TFP.
Without explicit expressions of firms’ R&D efforts as functions of state variables,
the model is silent on the responses in R&D to the shock of any arbitrary degree,
and I shall later let numerical experiments speak on that question. In the following,
I analyze the R&D responses to shocks with extreme degrees.
When the degree of shock, , is sufficiently large so that the gross profit of either
firm is vanishingly small, both firms reduce their R&D efforts in response to the shock.
Proposition 7 If X > 0 is small enough, there exists ̂ ∈ {1, · · · , }, such that if












Proposition 7 claims that when the magnitude of the shock is large enough, both
firms will respond by reducing their R&D efforts. When the destruction to profit is
so overwhelming and there is a long way to go before the loss can be recovered, both
firms will find the marginal value of an innovation lower than before, thus adjust their
R&D efforts downward.
At the other extreme, when the degree of shock is minimal, the leading firm will
always respond by increasing its R&D effort.
Proposition 8 If a negative profit shock with degree 1 occurs at time C > 0 and
lim
B→C−




Upon being hit by the shock with degree 1, the current firm value is strictly lower
for the leading firm, as can be seen from Lemma 4. However, this loss can be fully
recovered by one innovation. For this reason, the innovation is more valuable than
before the shock. This is why at least the leader has the incentive to do more R&D
after small shocks.
From the above two propositions, it is clear that when X in Assumption 3 is small
enough, for each firm 5 , there is a minimal threshold of the degree of the shock, above
which its response will be reducing R&D effort. Denote that minimum threshold by
̂ 5 (3 5 , 3− 5 ) to reflect the fact that it depends on the state just prior to the shock.
Specifically, if firm 5 is on the technology frontier prior to the shock, ̂ 5 (0, 3− 5 ) is
strictly greater than 1.
Suppose there is a leader and a laggard just before the shock. Without loss of
generality, let them be firm  and , respectively. Following the above analysis, if it is
the case that ̂ (0, 3) > ̂ (3, 0), then there exists a degree of shock  satisfying
̂ (3, 0) ≤  < ̂ (0, 3) to which the leader responds by higher R&D effort and
the laggard by lower R&D. consequently, during some period after the shock, the
expected technology gap is strictly higher than that the pre-shock level.
The above heterogeneity in R&D responses is the channel through which the
negative profit shock contributes to a larger technology gap, as is observed in Section
2.2. In the following sections, this mechanism is reproduced by a simulation of the
parameterized model, in Section 3.2; it is also confirmed empirically in Section 3.3.
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Chapter 3
Heterogeneous R&D Responses to Negative
Profit Shocks
Following the previous chapter, this chapter provides empirical evidence of the
heterogeneity in R&D responses to the negative profit shock and discusses its impli-
cation on economic growth.
3.1 Structual Estimation
So far the behavior of firms’ R&D, the technology gap, and their responses to the
NPS have been studied without specific forms of the profit and R&D cost functions.
However, to bring the theoretical model to quantitative analysis, such specification on
functional forms is necessary. I adopt the general equilibrium framework in Aghion
et al. (2001) to parameterize the profit function used in the previous two sections, and
structurally estimate model parameters using the same data with which I generate
the local projection impulse response functions in Section 2.2.
3.1.1 The Parameterized Model
There is a unit mass of infinitely-lived households, each consumes goods from a








log Gl (C) − ! (C)
 3C, (3.1)
where Gl denotes industry l’s output, and ! the labor supply. d > 0 is the discount
factor.
0For a detailed description of the data, see Appendix A
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In any industry l, the output Gl is produced with a constant elasticity of substi-







, U ∈ [0, 1] . (3.2)
The parameter U controls the degree of substitutability between the products of the
duopolists, and is constant across industries. By the logarithmic utility function in
(3.1), the consumer spend equal amount over each industry. Let this expenditure be
the numeraire, and denote the prices of products from firms  and  industry l by
?l, and ?l,, the consumer maximizes Gl subject to budget constraint ?l,Gl, +
?l,Gl, = 1.
A firm 5 ∈ {, } uses labor as the unique input of the following production
function:
H 5 = I 5 ! 5 = W
= 5 ! 5 , W > 1, (3.3)
where ! 5 is the quantity of labor hired by firm 5 . The productivity of firm 5 , I 5 = W= 5 ,
is strictly increasing in its technology level = 5 , which is modeled as the step on the
technology ladder in Section 2.3. Equivalently, it takes W−= 5 unit of labor to produce
one unit of product H 5 . It is shown1 that for U ∈ (0, 1), the profit function of firm 5
is a function of technology gap Δ= 5 , implicitly determined by
c(Δ= 5 |U, W) =
Z 5 (Δ= 5 |U, W) (1 − U)
1 − UZ 5 (Δ= 5 |U, W)
; (3.4)
(1 − UZ 5 )UZ 5 W−UΔ= 5 =
(
1 − U(1 − Z 5 )
)U (1 − Z 5 ), (3.5)
where Z 5 is firm 5 ’s revenue.
Finally, let the R&D cost function k 5 assumes quadratic form:




It is easy to check that the profit function jointly determined by equations (3.4)
and (3.5) satisfies Assumption 1; and that the R&D cost function (3.6) satisfies
Assumption 2. Therefore, the above general equilibrium framework is a special case
of my models in Section 2.3 and Section 2.4.
I use the baseline model for the structural estimation. This is valid because the
1See the proof of Proposition 1 in Aghion et al. (2001).
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sole extra parameter in the extended model is the destruction of the profit by the
shock, X, in the profit function (2.23). The choice of its value doesn’t affect the other
parameters in the stationary equilibrium without the shock.
To begin with, use the conventional values of the discount factor d = 0.03 and the
multiplier on the R&D effort _ = 1, from Aghion et al. (2001), respectively2.
The maximum technology gap < is arbitrarily assigned to be 103. Without loss
of generality, like in the baseline model, let the marginal R&D cost (thus also the
R&D cost given the quadratic form) of firm  to be no greater than that of firm :
0 < ^ ≤ ^.
Combining the R&D cost function (3.6) and the first-order condition (2.13) of the
R&D effort, the parameter ^ 5 for 5 = ,  can be calibrated as follows:
^ 5 =













) ∀ Δ= 5 , (3.7)
where the second equality is from equation (3.6). In the data, the equilibrium R&D
cost k 5 (0∗) can be approximated using firm-year R&D intensity. And I use the firm-
year value of patents, scaled by sale, as the proxy of the gain in firm value from
innovation. This is because, in Kogan et al. (2017), the stock market’s response to
patents itself reflects the value added to the firm by innovation.
I use firms with RDI between the second and third deciles of the industry-year
cell to calibrate ^, and use those between the seventh and eighth deciles for that of
^. The range between the two groups of firms is consistent with the fact that the
productivity dispersion is often measured by the inter-quartile range. The calibrated
values are ^ = 0.0167 and ^ = 0.0259. The details regarding the moment conditions
are left in the appendix. In the data, the firms with high R&D intensity on average
are found to have lower R&D cost, as would be predicted by Lemma 3.
The three parameters remaining to be determined are the parameter of elasticity of
substitution, U; the parameter in the production function, W; and the imitation rate,
ℎ. For them, there are no analytical moment conditions similar to (3.7). However,
with stationary distribution available from Definition 3 and Proposition 2, it is feasible
2Aghion et al. (2005) also uses _ = 1.
3It is not the interest of this thesis to pin down the maximum technology gap, as it is difficult to
say what one unit of gap corresponds to in reality. However, I would like to emphasize that if < as
an undetermined parameter is added into the estimation, the fitting of the model will be no worse
than reported here with the arbitrary choice of < = 10.
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to estimate them by the generalized method of moments (GMM) method4. I need
three target moments: the first one I pick is the expected ratio of the RDIs of low-cost
firms to that of the high-cost firms. The second moment is the expected ratio of firm
values between the two types of firms. The last one is the expected ratio of the gross
profits between these firms. The technical details on the procedure of estimation are
left in the appendix, and the outcomes of the estimations are summarized as follows:
Table 3.1: Model Parameters
Parameter Description Source Value
d discount factor Aghion et al. (2001) 0.03
_ multiplier on R&D effort Aghion et al. (2001) 1
< maximum technology gap assigned 10
^ R&D cost parameter of firm  calibrated 0.0167
^ R&D cost parameter of firm  calibrated 0.0259
U parameter in the CES utility function GMM 0.5159
W parameter in the production function GMM 1.3551
ℎ spillover rate GMM 0.0453
The estimated value of U is close to 0.5, suggesting a medium degree of substi-
tutability of the products between the duopolists, and thus a moderate competition on
the product market between firms with high and low R&D intensities in the sample.
The spillover rate ℎ is close to zero, meaning that relative to the firms’ R&D efforts,
the spillover (imitation) plays an insignificant role in the game of R&D races in the
real world. This is probably due to the strong protection of intellectual property in
the manufacturing sectors of the U.S.
The next table reports the performance of calibration and estimation in fitting
moments. The perfect fitting of the first two moments is due to the explicit expression
of ^ 5 in (3.7), where ^ 5 is consistent over all states Δ= 5 thus invariant to the stationary
distribution.
4An alternative approach, simulated method of moments (SMM), is also feasible. However, the
GMM is preferable in this case as stationary distribution of the states is available. It is computa-
tionally easier and free of additional assumptions required by SMM. For the latter, see Duffie and
Singleton (1993). Strebulaev and Whited (2012) provides a practical guide for both approaches.
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Table 3.2: Fitting of Moments
Description Data Model
Average first order condition for low-cost firms 0.0167 0.0167
Average first order condition for high-cost firms 0.0259 0.0259
Average relative R&D intensity, low-cost to high-cost firms 24.8303 24.6891
Average relative market value 12.5281 10.1600
Average relative gross profit 9.2506 9.0158
The first two moments inform ^ and ^, respectively. The following three mo-
ments jointly inform U, W, and ℎ in the GMM estimation. The baseline model does
a satisfactory job in fitting the selected moments from the data. This justifies the
usage of its extended version to study the impact of the negative profit shock.
3.2 Quantitative Analysis
With the model parameters obtained in Section 3.1, I proceed to show the behav-
ior of variables of interest in simulation, including R&D efforts, technology gap, and
output growth. I will first solve the baseline model numerically to obtain the value
functions and policy functions of the two firms, where the sole state variable is the
technology gap. Then I turn to the quantitative study of the extended model, where
the state is two-dimensional in firms’ distances to the technology frontier. The simu-
lation of the extended model helps in understanding the pattern of firms’ responses in
R&D to the NPS, and its implication on the dynamics of technology gap and output
growth.
3.2.1 Numerical Solution of the Baseline Model
The baseline model is numerically solved using value function iteration5. Firstly
set a initial value function v0 = {E0, (<), E0, (<)}<∈M , for example E 5 (<) = 0 for all





according to equations (2.13) and (2.14). For the next step, update value function
E1, 5 (<) using v0 and a∗0 on the right-hand side in (2.12) and (2.15) to get v1. Keep
iterating until the sequence of value functions {v: }∞:=0 converges. The outcome of the
iteration is plotted in the figure below:
The left panel of Figure 3·1 conveys two messages. Firstly, for either the low-cost
5The functional forms of the profit and R&D cost functions are the same as (3.4) and (3.6) which
I use for model parameterization.
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Figure 3·1: Numerical solution of the baseline model
firm (firm  in this example) or the high-cost firm (firm ), the value function is
strictly increasing in its technology gap. This is intuitive as a firm benefits from
a larger technology gap not only from a higher profit flow but also from the fact
that innovation brings an even greater profit flow. Secondly, for any state < ∈ M =
{−<,−< + 1, · · · , < − 1, <}, it is the case that E (<) > E (<), meaning the low-cost
firm’s value strictly dominates that of the high-cost firm’s. This is consistent with
Lemma 2, to which the explanation is that in the equilibrium, the low-cost firm can
achieve a performance measure at least the same as the high-cost firm, and from that
there’s still room for improvement from optimization.
It is not the case, however, that the low-cost firm will always choose higher R&D
effort than the high-cost firm, as is suggested by the right panel. The figure of





(0)). Another important difference in the R&D behaviors is that the effort
is decreasing for the low-cost firm, and for the high-cost firm it is increasing. This
is interpreted that the former, being most of the time the leader, is more devoted to
catching up when rarely left behind; the latter, almost always the follower, would try
harder to maintain the leading position when it has the chance.
From above it is clear that Lemma 3 doesn’t extend to cases where the maximum
technology gap < is greater than 1. Nonetheless, claims similar to Proposition 4 and
Corollary 2 still hold in the example here with < = 10. That is, for any < > 0, the
stationary probability that the low-cost firm is at state < is strictly higher than that
at −<: ` (<) > ` (−<). Consequently, the expected technology gap of firm  in
the stationary equilibrium is strictly positive: E [Δ= (C)] > 0. This can be seen from
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the figure below depicting the stationary distribution of firm ’s technology gap.







Figure 3·2: Stationary distribution of firm ’s technology gap
From Figure 3·2, for any < > 0, the stationary probability for firm ’s technology
gap to be Δ= = < is greater than that of Δ= = −<. And its expected technology
gap is calculated to be 9.3088, thus the low-cost firm is expected to be the leader in
the long run. So far, the properties of the numerical solution are in accordance with
the theory regarding the baseline model.
3.2.2 Numerical Solution of the Extended Model
Without the shock, the baseline, and the extended models are equivalent. From
now on, I use the extended model to see how the two firms with heterogeneous R&D
costs respond to the shock, and how would that impact the dynamics of the technology
gap.
To begin with, the profit function is now in the form of equation (2.23), where
the gap-dependent function c is identical to that used in the previous section. I
arbitrarily assign X = 0.05, meaning one degree of shock reduces the profit of either
firm by 5 percent. This makes the profit function depend on both 3 and 3 – the
distances of the two firms to the technology frontier – as do the value function and
policy function in the extended model.
The value function E 5 (3 5 , 3− 5 ) and policy function 0∗5 (3 5 , 3− 5 ) are again solved
numerically using value function iteration. Since they are now two-dimensional, the
outcomes are represented with heatmaps as follows, where black blocks correspond
to zero value. The symmetric off-diagonal black areas reflect the restriction that the
40
absolute difference between 3 and 3 cannot exceed the maximum technology gap
< = 10.




































Figure 3·3: Numerical solution of the extended model
For firm 5 the horizontal and vertical axes are the distances to the technology frontier
of its own and of its rival’s, 3 5 and 3− 5 , respectively. The two value functions have
separate color bars; the policy functions share a common color bar.
Compare panels (a) and (b) in Figure 3·3, for either firm, its value is higher when
it’s closer to the technology frontier, or when its leading position is more prominent.
More precisely, for any fixed 3 5 , the value function E 5 (3 5 , 3− 5 ) is increasing in its
technology gap 3− 5 − 3 5 . Also, for any integers 31, 32 ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 20}, it always holds
that E (31, 32) > E (31, 32). Both of these two patterns extend those shown by panel
(a) of Figure 3·1 for the baseline model.
An important contrast between the two rows of Figure 3·3 is that, for the
value functions, fix any colored grid (3 5 , 3− 5 ) < (20, 20), it is always the case that
E 5 (3 5 , 3− 5 ) > E 5 (3 5 + :, 3− 5 + :) for any integer : > 0 with which the value function
is defined. It means a firm’s value function is strictly decreasing in the degree of the
shock, as stated by Lemma 4. This is not true for the R&D efforts.
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From panels (c) and (d), the equilibrium R&D effort of either firm is not monotone
in the technology gap. For firm  (the low-cost firm), in the region above the diagonal,
its R&D effort increases monotonically to the northeast; below diagonal, it initially
increases in the distance to the frontier, but finally drops. A similar non-monotone
pattern of R&D in the distance from the technology frontier can be found for firm 
in panel (d) above diagonal, but below diagonal its R&D effort keeps decreasing as
moving away from the frontier.
Note that the axes of panels (c) and (d) are flipped, the difference in patterns
between these two panels means that if firm  is the leader when the negative profit
shock hits, then for any degree of shock, firm  will respond by a higher R&D effort
and firm  by a lower one. This heterogeneity in R&D responses is the key mechanism
in my model, it explains the positive impulse response of productivity dispersion to
the NPS. Later in this chapter, this mechanism will be examined with simulation and
confirmed by further empirical studies.
3.2.3 Simulation of the Impact of the Negative Profit Shock
As the first step of simulating the continuous-time dynamical system characterized
in Section 2.4, I discretize the time horizon to ) = 300 periods. The simulation
is repeated by  = 100, 000 times. For each repetition 1, I create two vectors of
dimension 1×) , 3̂,1, 3̂,1 to restore the realization of the distances to the technology
frontier. Set 3̂,1 (1) = 3̂,1 (1) = 0 for all 1 = 1, 2, · · · , , such that for all repetitions
the system begins with the state that the two firms are neck-to-neck on the technology
frontier.
Store the time-paths of R&D efforts of firms  and  in vectors 0̂,1 and 0̂,1. For
any C = 1, 2, · · · , ) , let 0̂ 5 .1 (C) be the equilibrium R&D effort: 0∗5
(
3̂ 5 ,1 (C), 3̂− 5 ,1 (C)
)
.
By the Markov property of the equilibrium, at each period C = 1, 2, · · · , ) , the R&D
effort chosen by firm 5 depends on the current state 3̂ 5 ,1 (C) only. Hence for each
repetition 1, from C = 2 on, the probability distribution of the state
(
3̂,1 (C), 3̂,1 (C)
)
is determined by the last period’s state and R&D efforts
(
3̂,1 (C − 1), 3̂,1 (C − 1)
)
.
The details on discretization and updating rule of state are left in the appendix.
For each repetition, let there be a shock at C = 2006 with degree  = 4.
That means after the realization of the state
(
3̂,1 (200), 3̂,1 (200)
)
, I change it to
6I leave some periods for the stochastic processes to evolve and approach to the limiting distri-
bution.
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3̂,1 (200) + 4, 3̂,1 (200) + 4
)
7. The choice of degree  = 4 is to be consistent with
the fact that the negative profit shock lowers about 20% of the gross profit at the
industry level. Thus in the extended model with the impact of one degree of shock
X = 0.05 as in (2.23), it requires a shock with degree 4 to be a proper analogy. The
values of X and  are not of qualitative importance for the simulation.
With the above design of shock, from C = 1, · · · , 199, the leading firm is on the
technology frontier, thus the dynamical system is equivalent to that of the baseline
model in the sense the technology gap and distances satisfy < 5 = 3− 5 − 3 5 and
min{3 5 , 3− 5 } = 0. At C = 200, the two firms are pushed back from the technology
frontier by four steps simultaneously, while their relative positions remain unchanged.
From this period on, until one firm returns to the frontier, the system can no longer
be described by the baseline model, but only by the extended model.
The impulse response of expected R&D efforts to the shock is approximated by
the mean of the simulated paths:





0̂ 5 ,1 (C), (3.8)
where 0̂ 5 (C) without repetition subscript 1 is the mean of the simulated R&D effort
of firm 5 at period C. For C ≥ 200, it serves as the simulated impulse response function
of firm 5 ’s R&D to the shock. Similarly, the simulated technology gap of firm 5 , Δ=̂ 5 ,
is calculated as






3̂− 5 ,1 (C) − 3̂ 5 ,1 (C)
]
. (3.9)
The following figure reports the simulated time paths of 0̂ (C), 0̂ (C) and Δ=̂ (C):





















Figure 3·4: Simulation of the impact of negative profit shock
Upon being hit by the shock, the low-cost firm instantly increases its R&D ef-
7The R&D efforts at C = 200 are determined after the shock happens.
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fort, and the high-cost firm responds by reducing its R&D effort. For some periods
afterward, the difference in R&D efforts is higher than the pre-shock level. These
movements in opposite directions cause a hump-shaped increase in the technology
gap, as shown in panel (c). Such change in the technology gap is gradual rather
than a jump because the path of the gap must travel through all the intermediate
states before reaching a higher level. In the longer horizon, as the difference in R&D
converges back to the pre-shock level, the technology gap also closes.
The simulation results reproduced the positive impulse response of the technol-
ogy gap to the negative profit shock, through the channel of heterogeneous R&D
responses. This proposed channel explains the IRFs productivity dispersion (Figure
2·1) and of RDI dispersion (2·2). The next section presents further empirical evidence
in support of this mechanism.
3.3 Empirical Evidence of Heterogeneous R&D Responses to
the NPS
In this section, I provide supportive evidence of the heterogeneous responses of
R&D to the negative profit shock. The simulation of the quantitative model predicts
that in response to the NPS, the low-cost firm increases its R&D effort, while the
high-cost firm reduces its R&D effort. The empirical tests in this section confirm this
pattern.
The R&D cost function of a firm is unobservable in the data. However, Lemma
3 predicts that the low-cost firm invests more in R&D than the high-cost firm. Thus
the implication to be tested is formulated as follows: firms with high R&D intensity
respond to the negative profit shock by increasing their RDI; while firms with low
RDI respond to the NPS by lowering their RDI.
The R&D intensity of firms from different industries are not directly comparable,
because industries may have different standards about whether a certain RDI is high.
So I use the within-industry empirical cumulative distribution function (ECDF) of
RDI to rank firms in the same industry. This ECDF of firm 8 in industry 9 at year C
is defined as follows:
8, 9 ,C =
∑
8′ 1{log('8′, 9 ,C) < log('8, 9 ,C)}∑
8′ 1{log('8′, 9 ,C) ∈ R}
. (3.10)
In this way,  ∈ [0, 1) ranks firms in the same industry-year cell by their R&D
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intensity. Using this ranking measure, the regression specification is as follows:
log('8, 9 ,C) = U8+XC+V#%( 9 ,C−1+W#%( 9 ,C−1×8, 9 ,C−1+[8, 9 ,C−1+,^8, 9 ,C+D8, 9 ,C ,
(3.11)
where U8 and XC are firm and year fixed effects; #%( is the negative profit shock defined
in (2.2). The set of control variables is denoted by ^, which includes the natural logs
of TFP, capital and employment, market share, number of firms in the industry-year
cell, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. The alternative setting ^ = ∅ will also be
used for robustness check.
With this specification, the coefficient W of the cross-term #%( ×  is of
interest. It captures the heterogeneity in the responses of current RDI from firms
sorted by their past RDI. For example, if the estimated Ŵ is significantly positive,
the interpretation is that firms with higher RDI in the past respond to the shock by
higher RDI, as compared to firms with low past RDI.
One concern about the above approach is that there may be high year-to-year
fluctuation in RDI, thus the last-year ECDF may fail to reflect a firm’s long-term
capacity to do R&D. To address this concern, I construct an alternative ranking
measure of RDI by replacing the annual R&D expenditure (RDE) by the three-year
moving average of RDE. The corresponding ECDF is denoted by MA3:








B0;48, 9 ,C , (3.12)
























In the context of the causal interpretation of the effect of the NPS on firm R&D,
the treatment is assigned at the industry level. Accordingly, the standard errors are
clustered at the industry level using the method as in Liang and Zeger (1986)8. The
outcome of regression (3.11) is reported in the following table:
8Abadie et al. (2017) claim that this method is conservative in the sense that it tends to overes-
timate the standard errors.
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Table 3.3: Responses of R&D intensity to the negative profit shock
log('C) (1) (2) (3) (4)
#%(C−1 −0.188∗∗ −0.212∗∗∗ −0.300∗∗ −0.385∗∗
(0.074) (0.061) (0.138) (0.157)











Control variables NO YES NO YES
'2 0.277 0.525 0.228 0.477
# 27, 390 27, 390 19, 384 19, 384
Note: Standard errors clustered at the industry level are in parenthesis. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
In Table 3.3, columns 1 and 2 use the ECDF of RDI based on the one-year lag
measure defined by (3.10); columns 3 and 4 are based on the alternative measure
using a three-year moving average. For all specifications, the coefficients of interest,
which are reported in the first, second, and fourth rows, are all significant, and their
signs are consistent with the prediction of the quantitative model.
The first row in Table 3.3 reports the average impact of the negative profit shock
on the R&D intensity for the least R&D intensive firms (whose ECDF values of
past RDI are close to zero). Across specifications, this impact is uniformly negative,
suggesting the least R&D intensive firms respond to the NPS by reducing their RDI
by a degree varying from 19 to 39 percent.
The average impact of the NPS on the current RDI for the most R&D intensive
firms (whose ECDF values of past RDI are close to one) is reflected by the sum of
estimated coefficients in the first row and those in the second or fourth row. Across
all specifications, the result means that for these high R&D intensive firms, their
responses to the NPS is to increase RDI by a range from 31 to 49 percent.
Results in Table 3.3 also imply that for those firms whose past RDI are close to
the within-industry median, the NPS has almost no impact on their RDI. This can
be seen by summing up the estimated coefficient in the first row and half of those in
the second and fourth row, and the outcomes are nearly zero.
The empirical test above confirms the heterogeneous R&D responses to the NPS
are in opposite directions, as is reproduced by the quantitative model (Figure 3·4)
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and generates the positive impulse response of technology gap. Now I test this hetero-
geneity again using another empirical design, with a semi-parametric model allowing
for non-linearity of R&D responses in firms’ past R&D intensity, so that the results
are less sensitive to outliers.
In this alternative empirical test, I sort firms in each industry-year cells to ten
groups partitioned by the industry-year specific deciles in RDI, 2B9 ,C , B = 1, · · · , 10.
These deciles are defined by
2B9 ,C = argmax
8′
{
log('8′, 9 ,C) : 8′, 9 ,C ≤ B/10
}
, (3.14)
where the variable  is the same as above in (3.10). Thus 2B9 ,C , B = 1, · · · , 10 are
the ten deciles of log(') in industry 9 at year C. The next step is to mark firms
with the number of the decile group it belongs to. To do so, I generate ten dummy
variables 2B
8, 9 ,C
from B = 1 to B = 10, defined as follows:
218, 9 ,C =

1 if log('8, 9 ,C) ≤ 219 ,C
0 otherwise
(3.15)
2B8, 9 ,C =

1 if 2B−19 ,C < log('8, 9 ,C) ≤ 2B9 ,C and 2 ≤ B ≤ 9
0 otherwise
(3.16)
2108, 9 ,C =






= 1 means that firm 8’s log RDI at year C falls between the second
and third deciles among those from all firms in the same industry-year cell. Finally,
in the previous regression (3.11), replace the variable ECDF by the set of group
dummies, and the regression formula becomes
log('8, 9 ,C) = U8 + XC +
10∑
B=1





8, 9 ,C−1 + ,^8, 9 ,C + D8, 9 ,C . (3.18)
Similar to specification (3.11), U8 and XC are firm and year fixed effects. #%(
stands for the negative profit shock; ^ the same set of control variables. The single
term #%( is omitted because the group of cross-dummies
{




saturated, thus including #%( 9 ,C incurs perfect multicolinearity.
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The estimates {ŴB}10B=1 captures the groupwise heterogeneous responses of RDI to
the NPS. Their estimated values and 90% confidence intervals are plotted in the figure
below.













Figure 3·5: Groupwise responses of firm RDI to the negative profit
shock
Panel (a) plots the groupwise responses of firm-level RDI to the negative profit shock
({ŴB}10B=1) and the 90% confidence intervals, using no control variables; panel (b) plots
those using control variables. The confidence intervals are based on robust standard
errors clustered on the industry level.
The interpretation of ŴB in specification (3.18) is similar to V̂ + Ŵ in (3.11). It
is the average impact of the negative profit shock on the RDI of firms in the decile
group B. The message from Figure 3·5 is consistent with that from Table 3.3: for
the low-RDI firms with small group numbers, such impact is a reduction in RDI; for
high-RDI firms whose group numbers are large, the impact is an increase in RDI.
These patterns are robust whether control variables are included or not. In the right
panel of Figure 3·5 where control variables are used, firms with past RDI close to the
median don’t respond significantly in R&D to the NPS.
Quantitatively, the semiparametric model (3.18) produces estimates close to those
from the parametric model (3.11). This can be seen from the average responses in
RDI in the low and high extremes from Figure 3·5, which are about −20 and 20 (40
if without controls) percent. These sizes of responses are almost the same as those
reported by Table 3.3, when the ECDF of last-year RDI takes 0 and 1, respectively.
To summarize, both of the two reduced-form empirical tests confirm the hetero-
geneous R&D responses to the NPS, as found in the simulation of the structurally
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estimated model (Figure 3·4). Specifically, both the parametric and semiparametric
approaches show that firms with high R&D intensity in the past respond to the shock
by raising their RDI, and that firms with low RDI in the past respond by reducing
their RDI. Moreover, the sizes of R&D responses reported by the two approaches
are almost the same. All these are supportive evidence that heterogeneous R&D re-
sponses are among – if not the only one of – the driving forces of the countercyclical
productivity dispersion.
3.4 Productivity Growth, and Why Dispersion is Good
I have proposed a theory that explains the countercyclical behavior of productiv-
ity dispersion by heterogeneous R&D responses to the negative profit shock. This
mechanism is reproduced by a quantitative model whose parameter values are based
on data. And it is also verified by empirical tests. In this section, I examine the
implication of this theory on the growth of productivity and output. I will first show
that my quantitative model predicts higher growth of productivity and output fol-
lowing a negative profit shock. Then I go on with a counterfactual analysis to study
how changing the rate of spillover affects firms’ R&D behaviors, technology gap, and
productivity growth.
3.4.1 Growth Rates in and off the Stationary Equilibrium
When there is no shock, the parameterized model in Section 3.1.1 converges to




E [Δ# (C + g) − Δ# (C)] = 0, ∀g > 0. (3.19)
This is because, after a sufficiently long time, the gap at C and at any future time
C + g follows the same limiting distribution, as can be seen from equation (2.20). By
definition of the technology gap, it means that in the long run, the expected growth
in levels of technology of the two firms during the same period is identical:
lim
C→∞
E [# (C + g) − # (C)] = lim
C→∞
E [# (C + g) − # (C)] , ∀g > 0. (3.20)
Since the advancement in levels of technology is the driving force of growth in
productivity and output, the equal expected progress across firms for the former
leads to the balanced expected growth of the latter.
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, is a constant in







Without shocks, although technological progress is endogenous and stochastic, the
equilibrium growth of productivity or output is balanced in the sense of constant ex-
pected ratio under stationary distribution. This balanced growth becomes a baseline
when I analyze the off-stationarity behavior of these variables immediately following
the shock. For that purpose, the notions of growth in the long run are no longer
informative, and a new concept of time or state-dependent growth rate is needed.
Now consider the off-stationarity growth, the growth rate 6- (C) of variable - (C)
is 6- (C) B
1
- (C) limΔC→0+
- (C + ΔC) − - (C)
ΔC
. It is properly defined as long as C > 0 and
- (C) ≠ 0, and for all variables so far concerned since they are right-continuous in
time. When - (C) is a random variable, its growth rate 6- (C) is also stochastic, hence
I shall focus on its expectation. Specifically, if the variable - (C) is a function of some
Poisson counting process, then its expected growth rate is a function of the arrival
rate.
Lemma 5 Let random variable - (C) be a function of Poisson counting process # (C)
with arrival rate _(C). The expected growth rate of it is
E[6- (C)] =
[





The earlier Propositions 7 and 8 state that regardless of the state of levels or gap
of technology, when the NPS with extremely large degree occurs, both firms respond
by reducing R&D efforts; if the shock is of small degree, the leading firm responds by
raising R&D effort. They have the following implications on the two firms’ expected
growth rates of productivity and output:
Proposition 10 In response to a negative profit shock with degree  occuring at
C > 0, firm 5 ’s expected growth rates of probability and output change as follows:
















for 5 ∈ {, };

















and only if Δ# 5 (C) ≥ 0.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Upon the occurrence of the NPS, jumps in R&D efforts affect the expected growth
rates through the arrival rate of innovation. Thus for the low-cost firm that responds
with higher R&D effort (see Figure 3·4), its expected growth rates of productivity
and output should also jump upward. However, for the high-cost firm whose R&D
effort drops in response to the NPS, its expected growth rates are not necessarily
lower. This is shown by the simulation below, where the growth rate of discretized
variable -̂C is calculated by 6-̂,C = log -̂C − log -̂C−1.
















Figure 3·6: Simulation of the impact of negative profit shock on ex-
pected
instantaneous growth rates
Before the shock happens (C = 0 on the horizontal axis), the expected growth
rates of productivity and output of both firms are stable at about 2 percent. This
is consistent with Proposition 9, and numerically not far from the real-world growth
rate of U.S. real GDP.
Upon the shock, the expected growth rates of productivity and output for the
low-cost firm instantly jump to about 6 percent. This is predicted by Proposition 10.
However, the growth rate of the high-cost firm also jumps upward, although its R&D
effort drops. This seemingly puzzling observation is due to the automatic catching-up
at the maximum gap. Prior to the shock, whenever the leader is at the maximum
technology gap, it ceases to do any R&D because innovation is not profitable at all
with the automatic catching-up (see equation (2.29)). It is no longer so when the
leader is away from the technology frontier due to the shock. Now, to recover the
lost profit provides extra incentive to innovate at the maximum technology gap, and
hence raising the productivity level of the follower through the automatic catching
up, despite the lower R&D effort by the latter. The follower’s reduction in R&D
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effort, nevertheless, is reflected by the difference in the expected growth rates of the
two firms. To see this, note that in Figure 3·6, immediately after the shock, the IRF
of the growth rate of either variable for the high-cost firm is obviously lower than
that of the low-cost firm’s.
In summary, after a negative profit shock, there is greater R&D heterogeneity.
Since the higher R&D effort by the low-cost firm is the driving force of industry-level
growth, it generates temporarily higher growth rates of productivity and output. It
is in this sense that productivity dispersion is good in bad times: following a negative
profit shock, the mechanism causing larger productivity dispersion also leads to higher
productivity growth. In the next subsection, I explore the quantitative relationship
between productivity dispersion and growth.
3.4.2 Counterfactuals on the Rate of Spillover
Ever since Nordhaus (1971), there has been a long thread of literature discussing
the optimal degree of protection of intellectual property9. In short, in the complete
absence of such protection, firms lack the incentive to innovate; if the protection is
too strong, such as in a patent system where the content of patents is never disclosed,
there will be deadweight loss in the view of the society out of monopoly pricing.
In this section, I utilize my quantitative model for a counterfactual analysis, to see
how different spillover rates affect the behavior of R&D, productivity dispersion, and
productivity growth.
Among all the parameters in my model, the one that the government has the most
influence on is ℎ – the one controlling the rate of spillover (or imitation). Again, it is
the exogenous rate by which the follower catches up by one step towards the leader,
regardless of how much R&D effort the follower exerts (see Section 2.3.1). From Table
3.1, this parameter is estimated to be 0.0453. Compared with the value of equilibrium
R&D efforts (see Figure 3·1 and Figure 3·3), the role of spillover in my quantitative
model is insignificant. The very low value of spillover rate suggests that there is a
very strong institutional protection of intellectual property in the U.S. manufacturing
industries from where I have the data. In the remainder of this section, I will show
how the dynamics of the economy change as a result of a higher spillover rate. The
government can raise the spillover rate by reducing the strength of patent protection,
or by encouraging cross-firm cooperation in innovation (for example, in Akcigit et al.
(2018)).
9For a thorough review of this Literature, see Rockett (2010).
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Counterfactual Distribution of Technology Gap
With other parameters fixed, a higher spillover rate changes the stationary distri-
bution of the technology gap in the way that the low-cost firm is less likely to be the
leader with large gaps. I use three counterfactual values of spillover rate: ℎ = 0.5,
ℎ = 2.5 and ℎ = 10. With them the stationary distribution of technology gap of the
low-cost firm  is depicted in the figure below:





















Figure 3·7: Counterfactual stationary distribution of technology gap
Contrast Figure 3·7 with the data-based Figure 3·2, slightly raising the spillover
rate ℎ from the estimated value 0.0453 to 0.5 reduces the probability mass on the
maximum technology gap and increases those over smaller gaps. A further increase
to ℎ = 2.5 makes the distribution almost symmetric and centered on gap < = 0. With
a very large rate of spillover ℎ = 10, for most of the time, the largest gap is < = 1,
because in this case catching-up comes so easily that a firm can hardly lead by two
steps.
Counterfactual Dynamics of R&D and Technology Gap
The discussion under this subtitle has two parts: firstly, how higher spillover rate
affects stationary levels of R&D efforts and technology gap; secondly, how changes in
spillover rate affect the IRF of the technology gap.
For the first question, raising the spillover rate has two conflicting effects on the
leading firm: on one hand, the stronger competition in technology motivates it to
innovate more frequently; on the other hand, it now has lower incentive to innovate
because the benefit from the innovation is reduced due to imitation. To see which
of these two effects is dominant, I run the simulation using the three counterfactual
values of ℎ: 0.5, 2.5, and 10.
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Figure 3·8: Simulation with counterfactual spillover rates
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Compare the stationary behaviors of variables in Figure 3·8 with those in the
structurally estimated model in Figure 3·4. As the value of spillover rate keeps in-
creasing through the three rows, the stationary level of expected R&D effort of the
low-cost firm  firstly increases, exceeding the data-implied level; it then drops be-
low that level as the spillover rate continues to rise. It is thus clear that for a mild
increase in the spillover rate, the competition effect dominates, and the leader thus
does more R&D on average; for too much increase in the spillover rate, the imitation
effect becomes dominant, causing the leader to do less R&D.
The changes of the expected R&D effort by the high-cost firm  in the stationary
equilibrium is also non-monotonic in the spillover rate, as can be seen from the middle
column of Figure 3·8. The right column shows that the stationary expected technology
gap is monotonically decreasing in the spillover rate, as would be predicted by the
pattern of change in the stationary distribution in Figure 3·7.
As of the second question, i.e. how the impulse responses to the negative profit
shock are affected by the spillover rate ℎ, note that with higher ℎ, the average size
of the positive response of the low-cost firm’s R&D effort is smaller. This is because
higher ℎ reduces the chance for the low-cost firm to be the leader when the shock
occurs, and thus there is on average less incentive for it to do R&D to recover the lost
profit. The other side of the same argument explains why the average R&D response
to the NPS by the high-cost firm turns from negative to positive as ℎ increases. The
decreasing size of R&D response by the low-cost firm (left column in Figure 3·8),
together with the increasing size of that by the high-cost firm (middle column), leads
to decreasing size of the impulse response of technology gap in ℎ (right column).
Counterfactual Productivity Growth, and Good Disperion
The last inquiry of this chapter is about what implications the spillover rate has on
productivity growth, both in stationary equilibrium and in response to the negative
profit shock. Everything said about productivity growth here also applies to output at
the industry level, because the latter is fully driven by the former in the quantitative
model, as can be seen in Figure 3·6.
The stationary productivity growth rates have the same non-monotonic relation-
ship with spillover rate ℎ as in the case of R&D efforts. That is, as ℎ increases, the
stationary productivity growth rate firstly rises, and then falls eventually. This is
shown by panel (a) of Figure 3·9 below. Again, this is explained by the pattern of
changes in R&D activities discussed above, that mild spillover is good for encouraging
R&D competition, while too much spillover makes innovation unprofitable.
55
















Figure 3·9: Industry-level productivity growth with counterfactual
spillover rates
Panel (b) of the above figure plots the deviation of productivity in percentage
from the stationary growth rate. From the figure, the higher the spillover rate, the
lower the size of the jump in productivity growth rate. Here I observe a positive
relationship between the sizes of impulse responses of technology gap (right column
in Figure 3·8) and productivity growth. Both of them are due to the sizes of changes
in R&D efforts by the two firms. This is another reason why productivity dispersion




Quality and Timing of Innovation
The previous two chapters are about the effect of heterogeneous R&D efforts.
other than the level or intensity of R&D, firms also choose from different R&D projects
to maximize their value. This chapter focuses on how firms make decision from R&D
projects different in quality and time structure, and how such decision is affected by
the protectionist policy. The study in this chapter is motivated by the event of the
1986 U.S.-Japan semiconductor trade conflict.
4.1 Related Literature
The study on the relationship between competition and innovation can be traced
back to the ’70s. Early theoretical work such as Salop (1977) and Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977) suggest that higher competition in the product market reduces the rent of
monopolistic power, thus disincentives innovation. Later empirical studies have shown
the opposite: both Nickell (1996) and Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1999), using
data from the U.K., find that competition is positively associated with TFP growth.
An updated theory like Aghion and Schankerman (2004) provides an explanation.
Events of international trade often lead to rapid changes in the product market
competition, and in a lot of cases with heterogeneous degrees in different sectors.
Such events have been regarded as natural experiments and used for the inquiry on
how firms’ R&D activities respond to changes in competition. Bloom, Draca and
Van Reenen (2015b) and Autor et al. (2019) study the impact of China’s joining
WTO on firms’ innovation in European countries and in the U.S., respectively, and
report the opposite findings: European firms that were more exposed to the China
shock responded by higher innovation, while a decline in innovation was found among
firms with high exposure to the same shock in the U.S.
The seemingly contradictory empirical findings above can be reconciled under
the theoretical framework of Aghion et al. (2005), who claim the existence of an
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inverted-U-shaped relationship between competition and innovation. Bloom et al.
(2014) propose a trapped-factor theory, and explain the European firms’ higher vol-
ume of innovation to the China shock by a lower opportunity cost of R&D.
This chapter also focuses on an event from international trade: the 1986 U.S. and
Japan semiconductor conflict, which led to trade protection over the U.S. semicon-
ductor manufacturing industry for five years. However, I’m not concerned with the
impact of this trade policy on the absolute or relative volume of R&D input. Instead,
I find that the protected firms’ R&D efficiency, measured by the returns to R&D, had
declined during the period of the policy. This is new to the empirical literature as it
suggests that the quality of R&D, other than its level or intensity, can be affected by
the policy that manipulates the degree of competition. It also requires a new theory,
for the extant literature, to the best of my knowledge, does not explain how changes
in competition may affect firms’ decisions on R&D projects with different qualities.
The empirical part of this chapter benefits from recent progress in the measure-
ment of innovation value: Kogan et al. (2017) estimate the economic value of patents
issued to the U.S. listed firms, by the stock market’s response to the issuance of
the patents. This new methodology is superior to earlier measures of the output of
R&D, which include patent number (Pakes and Griliches (1984), Griliches (1990)),
the count and pattern of citations (Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004), Hall, Jaffe and
Trajtenberg (2005), Gay et al. (2005), Marco (2007)) and patent renewal decisions
(Schankerman and Pakes (1986), Pakes (1986), Bessen (2008)). All these earlier mea-
sures are either indirect or without enough variation compared with the pecuniary
value of patent. Section 4.5 of this chapter shows an example of using this new mea-
sure of innovation value to examine the dynamic impact of current R&D input on
future output.
4.2 Historical Background
Before using the policy change from the 1986 U.S.-Japan semiconductor trade
conflict as a natural experiment, a brief description of this event is inevitable.
Japan rose to be a major supplier of semiconductor products in the late 1970s on
the global market. Its strength in this industry was especially reflected in a line of
products called the dynamic random-access memories (DRAM), whose market share
in the U.S. of Japanese firms jumped from under 30 to about 75 percent between
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1978 and 1986.1 Japan’s competitiveness in the more broadly defined sector was less
striking but still significant enough to impress the U.S. rivals: the Japanese share
of total U.S. semiconductor consumption increased from 7.5 percent in 1982 to 12.3
percent in 1984.2
It is thus not hard to perceive the threat felt by the U.S. domestic semiconductor
producers when the U.S. Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) filed a Section 301
petition to the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), complaining
Japan’s act of dumping. The incentive for the Japanese government to avoid the
pending 301 investigation was enough to bring it to the negotiation with the U.S.,
which led to the 1986 U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Trade Agreement. Only one year
prior to that, in 1985, the U.S. domestic shipment of microcomputers had fallen by 8
percent3.
There are two main provisions in the 1986 Agreement, about anti-dumping and
market access. With the first, Japan was to ensure a price floor on semiconductor
exports where the prices were set in conjunction with the U.S. government4, this
covered memory chips and other semiconductor products such as microprocessors
and microcontrollers. The price floor was maintained through “voluntary export re-
striction” under the supervision of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI). For the market access provision, Japan promised to increase the do-
mestic market share of foreign semiconductor products from about 10 to 20 percent5,
through “voluntary import expansion”. This agreement was reached in August 1986
and was known to expire on July 1, 1991. By agreeing to these terms, Japan had the
U.S.’s suspension of the Section 301 investigation on its semiconductor exports.
The U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Agreement was renewed in 1991. In the second
agreement, the anti-dumping provision was removed6, while the market access provi-
sion remained. The second agreement terminated in 1996 without further continua-
tion.
The shift from the first to the second U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Agreement, at
the year 1991, had marked the removal of the five years’ protection over the U.S.
semiconductor manufacturing industry. Around that time, to the best of my knowl-
1See Tyson (1993), page 106.
2See Irwin (1996b) in Krueger (1996b), page 7.
3See Irwin (1996b), page 8.
4See Bryan Johnson’s report The U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Agreement: Keeping Up the Man-
aged Trade Agenda by The Heritage Foundation, January 24, 1991, page 4
5See Baldwin (1994), page 136.
6See Irwin (1996a) in Krueger (1996a), page 13.
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edge, there were no other policy changes specific to the same industry. Therefore,
the impact of a temporary protectionist policy can be studied using a difference-in-
difference (DID) estimation, where the treatment group is the U.S. semiconductor
manufacturing industry, and the control group consists of other U.S. manufacturing
industries; the treatment is the removal of protection policy, which was implemented
by the anti-dumping provision during the regime of the first agreement but not under
the second one.
4.3 Estimation of Changes in R&D Performance
In this section, I use firm-level data from U.S. manufacturing industries to show
that, the R&D performance (to be defined soon) of the U.S. semiconductor firms
was higher in the policy regime without protection. The placebo test finds that the
timing of such change is consistent with that of the shift of policy regimes, which is in
favor of a causal interpretation. Moreover, the change in R&D performance cannot be
explained by the variation in R&D input, indicating that the removal of protectionist
policy had induced firms to adopt R&D projects with higher quality.
4.3.1 Data
Kogan et al. (2017) measure the economic value of patents issued to the U.S. listed
firms by the stock market’s response to the issuance of the patents. They then ag-
gregate the patent value to the firm-year level to reflect the innovation value. In this
chapter I use their data on innovation value as the R&D output, and construct the re-
turns to R&D. The input, R&D expenditure, is obtained from the CRSP/Compustat
Merged Database.
I combine the CRSP/Compustat Merged Database and the NBER-CES Manu-
facturing Database to estimate the revenue TFP using a cost-share-based method7.
The former provides information on firm fundamentals such as employment, capital,
and sale; the latter on the industry-specific labor share and price deflators for fac-
tors and output. The merged dataset is an unbalanced panel with 13, 574 firm-year
observations from 1986 to 1996. There are 2, 471 firms from 135 U.S. manufacturing
industries, out of which 95 firms are from the semiconductor manufacturing industry.
Given the fact that different non-semiconductor firms have heterogeneous con-
nections through the input-output network with the semiconductor manufacturing
7One recent example of this method is Foster et al. (2017).
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industry, the use of them as the control group in a difference-in-difference regression
may incur concerns, so might the gap in the sizes of the treatment group and the
control group do. Therefore, I employ the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
Use Table, a matrix recording the value of intermediate goods used by each sector
from all industries, to construct a connection index controlling for the degree of con-
nection of each industry to semiconductor manufacturing, and use it for robustness
check.
4.3.2 Response of RRD to the Removal of Protection
In this chapter, R&D performance is measured by returns to R&D, which is the
value of future innovation divided by current R&D expenditure. Ideally, the output
and input should be matched at the project level. Unfortunately, however, how
much has been invested on certain R&D projects that produce a given patent is
unobservable. Pakes and Griliches (1984) in Griliches (1984) study the time structure
of the input-output relationship of R&D using a distributed lag regression, and find
that the current year’s research expenditure has the strongest explanatory power on
the number of patents applied, while those from the first to the fifth lags in year have
no statistically significant contribution to patent filing. It should also be taken into
consideration how long it takes for the applied patents to get granted. The answer
given by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is an average of 23.9 months
8. With the above knowledge, I use the following two forms of returns to R&D at
different time horizons. The first one is the one-year forward RRD:




and the second the three-year forward moving average RRD:
''MA38, 9 ,C =
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where )B< is the economic value of innovation of firm 8 from industry 9 at year C,
whose data is provided by Kogan et al. (2017); ' refers to the R&D expenditure.
Using the above defined RRD as the dependent variable, my specification to iden-




ln ''8, 9 ,C = U8 + XC + V(4<8 9 × %>BCC + ,^8, 9 ,C + Y8, 9 ,C , (4.3)
where U and X are the firm and year fixed effects. The dummy variable (4<8 indicates
whether the industry is semiconductor manufacturing9. And the dummy %>BC divides
the sample into two policy regimes by the pivotal year 1991 (included) in which the
protection over the U.S. semiconductor industry was lifted. The coefficient on their
interaction term thus captures the DID effect of the removal of protection on the
protected firms’ R&D performance. For example, if V is estimated to be positive and
significant, it implies that the semiconductor firms’ R&D performance improved in
response to the removal of the protectionist policy.
The ^ in the above specification denotes the set of control variables. In the
baseline estimation, I use the following three controls: (1) firm age, defined as the
time gap between the current year and the year of the first appearance of the firm in
the CRSP/Compustat Merged Database10; (2) natural log of revenue TFP, obtained
through the cost-share-based method; (3) market share, which is the percentage of a
firm’s sale over the aggregate sales of the industry-year cell. These three covariates
control for the effects of experience or learning, technological level, and size on returns
to R&D.
One important robustness check is the inclusion of R&D intensity as an explana-
tory variable to control for the returns to scale of R&D, I also allow heterogeneous
returns to scale of the semiconductor industry relative to the others by adding the
cross-term of log RDI and the (4<8 9 dummy. If the coefficient V in regression (4.3)
is significant after controlling for the returns to scale of R&D, it is evident that the
difference in RRD of the semiconductor firms across policy regimes are not due to
the changes in R&D input. Another robustness check is to turn regression (4.3) as a
dynamic panel model by adding the one-year lag of the log RRD at the right-hand
side.
The estimation results from the above identification strategy are reported in the
table below:
9Specifically, (4<8 9 = 1 if and only if industry 9 ’s four-digit Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) code is 3674, with the description “Semiconductors and Related Devices”.
10The earliest year in the dataset is 1950, I give no treatment to the issue of censored data.
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Table 4.1: Response of RRD to the Removal of Protection
Dependent variable log(RRDF1) log(RRDMA3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(4<8 × %>BC 0.364∗∗∗ 0.681∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗ 0.862∗∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.111) (0.106) (0.093) (0.121) (0.092)
Controls
firm age 0.043∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008)
log(TFP) 0.223∗∗∗ −0.150 −0.126 0.147∗∗∗ −0.208∗∗ −0.341∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.104) (0.102) (0.047) (0.082) (0.058)
market share 0.436∗ 0.482∗∗ 0.361 0.354 0.370 −0.017
(0.239) (0.232) (0.219) (0.257) (0.246) (0.141)
Returns to scale of R&D
log(RDI) −0.488∗∗∗ −0.374∗∗∗ −0.445∗∗∗ −0.385∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.072) (0.080) (0.061)
(4<8×log(RDI) −0.045 −0.114∗∗ −0.265∗∗∗ −0.267∗∗∗




Constant −0.689∗∗∗ −1.200∗∗∗ −0.637∗∗∗ −1.151∗∗∗ −1.663∗∗∗ −0.841∗∗∗
(0.184) (0.209) (0.196) (0.198) (0.222) (0.154)
'2 0.124 0.189 0.427 0.124 0.157 0.596
# 4, 365 4, 365 3, 052 2, 469 2, 469 1, 952
Note: standard errors clustered at the industry level are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
In the above table, across all specifications, the estimated DID effects are positive
and significant, showing that the removal of the protectionist policy on the U.S.
semiconductor firms is associated with their higher returns to R&D by 36 to 68 percent
at the one-year horizon, and by 52 to 86 percent at the three-year horizon. This rise in
returns to R&D cannot be explained by the variation in the intensity, or the returns
to scale, of the R&D activity. This empirical fact thus suggests that the average
quality of the R&D projects taken by these U.S. semiconductor firms was lower with
protection than without. Therefore, unless these firms suddenly received a superior
menu of R&D projects as of the removal of the protection, which I find no evidence
of, it must be the case that they had chosen the low-quality R&D projects when they
were under protection, and resumed the high-quality projects as the protection was
removed.
4.3.3 Timing Test
To strengthen the causal interpretation of the relationship between policy change
across 1991 and the difference in RRD from these two policy regimes, I replace the
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post-1991 dummy %>BC in regression (4.3) by a set of year indicators:




VB(4<8 9 × 1{C = B}
)
+ ,^8, 9 ,C + Y8, 9 ,C (4.4)
The sequence of coefficients {VB}1996B=1986 from the above model captures the year-by-
year difference in RRD between the semiconductor firms and those from other U.S.
manufacturing industries. This type of timing test is also used in Pierce and Schott
(2016) as a recent example. It is an illustrative way to see whether the timing of the
break in trend of the dependent variable can be matched to that of a certain event.
I plot the estimated coefficients {VB}1996B=1986 against the years in the figure below.












Figure 4·1: Test for Timing
This figure shows the year-by-year point estimates of DID coefficients { V̂B} and the 90%
confidence intervals using standard errors clustered at the industry level. The left panel
uses the one-year forward returns to R&D as the dependent variable; the right panel uses
the three-year forward moving average RRD.
The left panel, using the one-year forward measure of RRD, shows a clear break in
trend at 1991, the starting year of the second U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Agreement
which marked the removal of the protection over the U.S. semiconductor industry.
The right panel uses the three-year forward moving average RRD, and shows a break
in trend one year prior to the pivotal year of 1991. This is probably due to the nature
of this forward moving average measure of RRD at a longer time horizon, that it
captures the structural change in R&D output before it happens.
To the best of my knowledge, around the pivotal year of 1991, other than the
transition from the first to the second U.S-Japan Semiconductor Trade Agreement,
there were no major events in the U.S. semiconductor industry of comparable impor-
tance that could generate the observed difference in R&D performance. Thus with
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the results from the above placebo test, I attribute the difference-in-difference effect
found in Section 4.3.2 to the removal of protectionist policy.
4.3.4 Control for Cross-Industry Connection
Semiconductor products serve as the intermediate inputs of many industries, in-
cluding semiconductor manufacturing itself. Therefore, any policy change in this
sector may have uneven impacts on all the other directly or indirectly connected in-
dustries. To control for the unbalanced impacts through the cross-industry network
on the control group in the DID estimation in Section 4.3.2, I construct a measure of
connection to the semiconductor industry, and use it to see if the correction of any
potential bias from the network effect may substantially change the previous findings.
A good source of information on cross-industry connection is the Use Table avail-
able provided by the BEA. It is an industry-level square matrix recording the value
of intermediate inputs from different upstream industries used by each industry in a
given year. Unfortunately, the earliest year for the available Use Table with a defini-
tion of industries fine enough to separate the semiconductor industry from the others,
and at the same time can be matched with the CRSP/Compustat Merged Database
using the NAICS code11, is 2007. The assumption I have to adopt is thus that there
were no structural changes in the cross-industry network from semiconductor manu-
facturing to others.
I normalize the Use Table - by converting from the value to the percentage of
the product from each industry used by all the industries, denote the normalized
matrix by , and calculate it Leontief inverse matrix ! = ( − )−1 where  is the
identity matrix. The Leontief inverse ! summarizes the relevance of the supply from
one sector, through all direct or indirect channels within the network, on the final
output of another sector. I then take out of the Leontief inverse matrix ! the vector
in which semiconductor manufacturing12 is the upstream sector, and use its entries
as the measure of the cross-industry connection from it to all industries. To justify
the validity of this connection index (CI), I list the top 15 industries most connected
to semiconductor manufacturing, together with their connection index value:
11The NAICS is short for the North American Industry Classification System. It is the standard
used by Federal statistical agencies in the U.S.
12NAICS code 334413: semiconductor and related device manufacturing.
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Search, detection, and navigation instruments manufacturing
Printed circuit assembly (electronic assembly) manufacturing
Semiconductor and related device manufacturing
Light truck and utility vehicle manufacturing
Iron and steel mills and ferroalloy manufacturing
Computer storage device manufacturing
Aircraft engine and engine parts manufacturing
Aircraft manufacturing
Electronic computer manufacturing
Other communications equipment manufacturing
Figure 4·2: Industries Most Connected to Semiconductor Manufac-
turing
I utilize the connection index in two ways. Firstly, I add the cross term between
the connection index and the policy regime dummy,  9 × %>BCC , into the regression
(4.3) as an additional control variable:
ln ''8, 9 ,C = U8 + XC + V(4<8 9 × %>BCC + W 9 × %>BCC + ,^8, 9 ,C + Y8, 9 ,C . (4.5)
In this way, the network effect from the policy change is controlled for. Secondly,
I divide the full sample evenly into three subsamples according to the connection
index value, and use the three subsamples as the control group for regression (4.3).
This method tests if the magnitude or significance of the DID effect depends on the
choice of the control group with different degrees of cross-industry connection to the
treatment group. Again, I use the two measures of returns to R&D (4.1) and (4.2)
as the dependent variable. The results are reported in the table below:
Table 4.2: Response of RRD to the Removal of Protection, Control for Network Effect
Dependent variable log(RRDF1) log(RRDMA3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(4<8 × %>BC 0.485∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗ 0.205 0.762∗∗∗ 0.769∗∗∗ 0.536∗∗∗ 0.743∗∗∗ 1.090∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.121) (0.131) (0.186) (0.135) (0.168) (0.230) (0.193)
 × %>BC 0.366∗ 0.855∗∗
(0.216) (0.330)
Controls
firm age 0.024∗∗ 0.011 0.041∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.018) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.020) (0.021) (0.016)
log(TFP) −0.136 0.018 0.086 −0.346∗∗ −0.277∗∗∗ −0.148 −0.249∗∗ −0.408∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.107) (0.076) (0.158) (0.092) (0.139) (0.089) (0.110)
market share 0.378 0.036 1.325∗ 0.321 0.423 −0.265 1.611∗ 0.135
(0.291) (0.410) (0.705) (0.361) (0.329) (0.539) (0.791) (0.401)
Returns to scale of R&D
log(RDI) −0.369∗∗∗ −0.230 −0.256∗∗∗ −0.530∗∗∗ −0.459∗∗∗ −0.248 −0.529∗∗∗ −0.582∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.166) (0.083) (0.116) (0.085) (0.172) (0.080) (0.077)
(4<8×log(RDI) −0.111∗ −0.210 −0.144∗∗ −0.037 −0.288∗∗∗ −0.482∗∗∗ −0.199∗∗∗ −0.222∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.141) (0.052) (0.081) (0.063) (0.147) (0.064) (0.054)
Dynamic panel
L.log(RRD) 0.271∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.113∗ 0.087∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.051) (0.041) (0.026) (0.031) (0.054) (0.036) (0.031)
Constant −0.505∗∗ −0.348 −1.017∗∗∗ −0.364 −1.645∗∗∗ −1.670∗∗∗ −2.160∗∗∗ −0.950∗∗∗
(0.198) (0.387) (0.318) (0.230) (0.228) (0.342) (0.464) (0.233)
Sample Full High CI Medium CI Low CI Full High CI Medium CI Low CI
'2 0.454 0.647 0.397 0.224 0.208 0.269 0.152 0.071
# 2, 278 1, 010 852 964 1, 498 677 614 651
Note: standard errors clustered at the industry level are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
The high, medium and low CI samples include observations with connection index above the 66 percentile, between the 33 and 66 percentiles, and
below the 33 percentile, respectively.
67
Compare Table 4.2 with Table 4.1, the cross-industry network effect doesn’t change
the DID effect of the policy change in either the significance or the magnitude. The
only exception is the regression using the one-year forward RRD measure and the
medium CI control group, its significance of the DID estimate is lower, at the 15%
level.
The empirical findings so far suggest that the removal of protectionist policy, as
the second U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Trade Agreement placed the first one, had led
to higher returns to R&D of those previously protected semiconductor firms. This
improvement in R&D performance was not due to mechanical reasons such as the
returns to scale of the R&D intensity, nor could it be explained by the cross-industry
input-output network. Therefore, as mentioned at the end of Section 4.3.2, a natural
conjecture is that the U.S. semiconductor firms had voluntarily adopted low-quality
R&D projects when protected, and switched back to high-quality projects when the
protection was no more. Such firm behavior cannot be rationalized unless those low-
quality R&D projects were advantageous in some other aspects, which must have been
relevant to the protectionist policy. In the next section, I propose a theory where
firms face short-term and long-term innovation options, and temporary protection
causes some firms to switch from long-term to short-term projects. By doing so,
these firms sacrifice innovation quality to be able to benefit from the protection in a
timely fashion. This theory explains the lower returns to R&D associated with the
protectionist policy, and is later verified by further empirical tests.
4.4 A Theory on the Quality and Timing of Innovation
The empirical findings in the previous section show an improvement in R&D
performance in response to the removal of protection, which is not due to variations in
R&D intensity or cross-industry network effect, and is thus likely to reflect the change
in the quality of R&D project. It remains to be answered how the protectionist policy
had induced the U.S. semiconductor firms to choose the low-quality R&D projects.
This section proposes a parsimonious theory in which firms choose between innovation
projects with different quality and time structure, and shows how the temporary
protectionist policy drives some firms to switch from the long-term innovation with
high quality to short-term one with low quality. This theory rationalizes the firm
behavior identified in the previous section, and has implications that are and tested
and verified in the next one.
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4.4.1 Consumer Optimization
Consider an economy where there is a representative consumer who lives for two
periods and consumes a continuum of differentiated goods, each produced by a distinct
firm. The amount and price of variety 9 are denoted as @ 9 and ? 9 , 9 ∈ [0, 1]. There is
no means of saving, thus the consumer solves the same utility maximization problem











? 9@ 939 = 1 (4.6)
where V ∈ (0, 1). The simple functional form, which is a monotone transformation
of the Dixit-Stiligtz specification and resembles those used in Aghion et al. (2018)
and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), is meant to facilitate the tractability of the model.
With it, the demand function for variety 9 at period C is














The variable _, as in Aghion et al. (2018), is interpreted as a measure of competition.
This is because, as is to be shown later, _ in the equilibrium is decreasing in the
measure of firms that are targeted and excluded from the market by the protectionist
policy. This can be seen from equation (4.7), where the protection, by suppressing
the total supply, lowers _ and shifts upwards the demand curve for each variety of
goods. In this way, the incumbent firms benefit from the protection with a larger
profit margin.
4.4.2 Firm Optimization
Each firm produces a variety of the differentiated goods in both periods C = 1, 2,
and thus shares the same index as the variety 9 ∈ [0, 1]. Firms are heterogeneous in
the endowed unit cost at the beginning of the first period, which they can choose to
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reduce through innovation. I denote firm 9 ’s endowed unit cost by 2 9 without time
subscript, and that after innovation by 2 9 ,C with the time subscript. For now, suppose
firm 9 produces with given 2 9 ,C , leaving the innovation decision for later discussion.
The firm’s optimal quantity is determined by solving the following profit maxi-
mization problem:






− 2 9 ,C@ 9 ,C (4.9)
From the first order condition, the optimal quantity is a function of unit cost and
competition:






By (4.7) and (4.10), firm’s optimized profit is also a function of 2 9 ,C and _C :













It is easy to show that the firm’s optimized profit in period C is decreasing in the
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(1 − V)_C
(4.12)
is strictly positive. It means that a drop in the degree of competition makes innovation
more favorable, as reducing the unit cost by the same size increases the optimized
profit by more.
4.4.3 Innovation Decision
At the beginning of the first period, the firm observes its endowed unit cost 2 9
and decides whether to innovate. If it chooses not to innovate, it produces with the
endowed cost in both periods. If it innovates, there is a further choice to make between
the short-term and the long-term innovation projects. The short-term project reduces
the endowed cost immediately, so that the firm can produce with the lowered unit cost
in both periods. Should be long-term project be adopted, the endowed unit cost will
be reduced in the second period only, but by a greater size. Hence the model imposes
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on the firm a tradeoff between the quality and time structure regarding innovation.
Formally, I denote firm 9 ’s innovation decision  9 of not innovating by =, of adopting
the short-term project by B and the long-term project by ;. The effective unit cost of
firm 9 conditional on endowed cost 2 9 is expressed as follows:
(




(2 9 , 2 9 ), if  9 = =
(YB2 9 , YB2 9 ), if  9 = B
(2 9 , Y;2 9 ), if  9 = ;
(4.13)
where 0 < Y; < YB < 1. Given the competition in both periods, (_1, _2), and the
endowed unit cost 2 9 , each firm chooses an innovation scheme to maximize its value
function, which is the discounted sum of the optimized profits in the two periods:
+ (2 9 , _1, _2) = max
 9∈{=,B,;}
c∗(2 9 ,1, _1)+dc∗(2 9 ,2, _2)− 5B ·1
{




 9 = ;
}
, (4.14)
The parameter d ∈ (0,∞) is the discount factor, it can be greater than one in the
case where the length of the long-term is longer than the short-term. Parameters 5B
and 5; represent the fixed cost of adopting the short-term and long-term innovation,
respectively. In this simple model, there is no uncertainty regarding innovation. In
this sense, it is similar to the “technology upgrading” in Bustos (2011), where the cost
and size of upgrading are also fixed.
4.4.4 Protectionist Policy
All firms consisting the continuum 9 ∈ [0, 1] are labeled as either domestic ( 9 ∈ )
or foreign ( 9 ∈ ), such that  ∩  = ∅ and  ∪  = [0, 1]. To make the model
non-trivial, I assume that the measure of each type of firm is strictly positive:
Assumption 4 `() > 0 and `() > 0, ` is the Lebesgue measure.
The protectionist policy is characterized by (<1, <2) with <C ⊂  , such that all
foreign firm in the index set <C are forbidden to sell its products in period C, i.e.
@ 9 ,C = 0 if 9 ∈ <C . If there is no protection, <C = ∅ for C = 1, 2. A temporary
protection is modeled as `(<1) > 0 and <2 = ∅. Similarly, a permanent protection
is when <1 = <2 and `(<1) > 0. For simplicity, I assume that foreign firms do not
innovate:
Assumption 5  9 = =, if 9 ∈ .
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This assumption ensures that the analysis focuses on the innovation decision as well
as its response to the protectionist policy of the domestic firms alone. The impact of
such a policy on the targeted instead of protected firms can be interesting. However,
since my data covers the domestic firms only, any response to the policy by the foreign
firms is unobservable, and any implication from a theory on their actions untestable.
It is for this reason I assume the unresponsiveness of the foreign firms to the policy. In
this sense, Assumption 5 can be relaxed to that all foreign firms’ innovation decisions
are fixed regardless of the protectionist policy, to do so, however, will increase the
complexity of the model without adding insights.
4.4.5 Existence of Equilibrium




9∈[0,1] and the protection policy (<1, <2), the
equilibrium consists of domestic firms’ optimal innovation decision and competition
(_1, _2) determined by such decisions.
Definition 6 Given a protection policy (<1, <2), an equilibrium is a tuple {, _1, _2},
where
1. The optimal innovation strategy  : R3++ → {=, B, ;} maps from endowed unit
cost 2 9 and competition (_1, _2) to an innovation scheme that solves problem (4.14);







39 , where 2 9 ,C is determined by the optimal
innovation strategy .
In the above definition, the second condition comes from equations (4.8) and (4.10).
Firms choose one out of three innovation schemes by comparing the value derived
from them. Let Δ+− ′ be the difference in firm value between adopting innovation
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+ ( 5; − 5B) (4.17)
For example, Δ+=−B denotes the difference in the firm value with no innovation and
that with short-term innovation. A firm adopts the short-term innovation project if
and only if Δ+=−B ≤ 0 and Δ+B−; > 0, the similar applies for other pairwise comparison
of schemes. The following two lemmas show the firm’s innovation decision when the
endowed cost 2 admits extreme values:
Lemma 6 lim2→∞ Δ+=−B > 0; and lim2→∞ Δ+=−; > 0.
Proof. By (4.15) and (4.16), lim2→∞ Δ+=−B = 5B > 0, lim2→∞ Δ+=−B = 5; > 0. 
When the endowed cost is very high, the payoff from innovating, no matter with
which project, is so low that it is overwhelmed by the fixed cost, so the firm opti-
mally chooses not to innovate. The other extreme case in which the endowed cost is
vanishingly small is studied in the following Lemma:
Lemma 7 lim2→0+ Δ+=−; < 0; and lim2→0+ Δ+B−; < 0 if 1+ dYV/(V−1); > (1+ d)Y
V/(V−1)
B .
Proof. By (4.16), lim2→0+ Δ+=−; = −∞ < 0. By (4.17) and under the parameter restric-
tion, lim2→0+ Δ+B−; = −∞ < 0. The property is also used that for any protectionist
policy (<1, <2), it must be _1 ≤ _2. 
When a domestic firm’s endowed cost is small enough, as long as the parame-
ter restriction in Lemma 7 holds, the firm always chooses the long-term innovation
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project. Intuitively, this is either because d is large so that the long term overweighs
the short term; or that Y; is sufficiently low relative to YB such that the quality of
long-term project exceeds that of the short-term one by a considerable degree. To
have some firms adopting the short-term innovation project, which is necessary to
show how the protectionist policy make firms switch between the short-term and
long-term projects, the additional condition of 5; > 5B is needed, with which some
firm with medium endowed cost prefer the short-term project for its lower fixed cost.
The above restrictions on the parameters are summarized in the assumption below.
Assumption 6 1 + dYV/(V−1)
;
> (1 + d)YV/(V−1)B , and 5; > 5B.
Assumption 6 narrows down the equilibrium to a special class where the innovation
decision is monotone in the endowed unit cost. An equilibrium with such property is
called a monotone equilibrium.
Definition 7 An equilibrium is monotone if for any two firms 9 , 9 ′ ∈  and 2 9 ≠ 2 9 ′,
given  9 =  9 ′ = ] ∈ {=, B, ;}, 2 9 ′′ ∈
(
min{2 9 , 2 9 ′},max{2 9 , 2 9 ′}
)
always imply  9 ′′ = ] for
a third firm 9 ′′ ∈ .
In a monotone equilibrium, if two domestic firms with different endowed cost choose
the same innovation scheme, all domestic firms whose endowed cost lie in-between
shall choose the same scheme. Equivalently, in any equilibrium, there are critical
values that divide the range of endowed cost into intervals, over which all firms have
the same innovation decision.
Proposition 11 Under Assumption 6, any equilibrium is monotone.
Proof. Under Assumption 6,
mΔ+=−B (2 9 , _1, _2)
m2 9
,
mΔ+=−; (2 9 , _1, _2)
m2 9
and
mΔ+B−; (2 9 , _1, _2)
m2 9
are all strictly positive for any (2 9 , _1, _2) ∈ R3++. This will lead to
a contradiction if  9 ′′ ≠ ] in Definition 7. 
With Proposition 11, proving the existence of the equilibrium translates to finding
critical values that separate the range of 2 9 into regimes in which all firms adopt the
same innovation scheme.
Proposition 12 For any policy (<1, <2), there exists a unique equilibrium if{
2 ∈ R++ \ {∞}|∃ 9 ∈ [0, 1], 2 = 2 9
}
is connected and non-singleton.
Proof. See Appendix.
With Proposition 12, the next step is to compare equilibria with and without the
protectionist policy to study its impact on the innovation decisions.
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4.4.6 Effect of Temporary Protection
This section focuses on the comparative statics of two otherwise identical economies,
one without any protection (<1 = <2 = ∅), and the other under temporary protec-
tionist policy (`(<1) > 0, <2 = ∅). The existence of equilibrium in each economy is
guaranteed by Proposition 12. The concept of temporary protection fits the historical
background because the first U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Trade Agreement, with its
anti-dumping provision, had a duration of five years, which was known to all parties
at the beginning of its implementation.
Denote the equilibrium set of domestic firms taking innovation scheme ] ∈ =, B, ;
without protection by #] ; and that under the temporary protection )] . To have a
clear look at the impact of the policy, suppose that in the no-protection equilibrium,
the firms adopting the short-term and long-term innovation projects both have strictly
positive Lebesgue measures.














Proposition 13 states that as long as there is a non-trivial mass of firms taking
short-term and long-term innovation projects in the economy without protection, the
imposition of a temporary protectionist policy drives a positive measure of firms shift-
ing from the long-term to the short-term project. Intuitively, temporary protection
increases profitability for domestic firms by suppressing the equilibrium competition
_1, creating a stronger incentive to reduce the unit cost in a timely manner (see
equation (4.12)). Therefore, the firms who are almost indifferent between the two
innovation projects without protection will trade quality for timeliness by adopting
the short-term project.
The next analytical result is about the relationship between the size of the foreign
firms targeted by the temporary protectionist policy, and that of the domestic firms
whose innovation decisions are changed by it. Suppose there are two such policies
") = (<1, ∅) and "′) = (<′1, ∅), where <1, <1′ ⊂  , and denote the sets of do-
































Intuitively, Proposition 14 claims that if more foreign firms are targeted, or foreign
firms with higher productivity are targeted, by the temporary protectionist policy,
then there will be more domestic firms who trade quality for timeliness of innovation
as a result.
So far, the discussion has been about the quality of innovation without a formal
definition. Now I measure the quality by the increment in productivity, which is the
inverse of the unit cost: A] =
1 − Y]
Y]
, ] = B, ;. In this way, the average quality of





With the above definition, the relationship between the protectionist policy and the
average quality of innovation is clear.
Corollary 4 The average quality of innovation is strictly lower under temporary pro-







Proof. This follows directly from Propositions 13 and 14. 
Corollary 4 gives a theoretical answer to the question I have left at the end of
Section 4.3, that is, the average R&D performance declines under the temporary pro-
tectionist policy because some firms prefer timeliness to quality facing higher prof-
itability in the short term. A discrepancy between the empirics and the theory is
worth mentioning: in the empirical part of this chapter, the returns to R&D is mea-
sured in the pecuniary value of innovation; in the theory, however, the quality of
innovation is defined by the changes in the unit cost, while the change in product
price caused by the protection is not taken into account. Nevertheless, it shall not
yield a lower explanatory power of the theory to the empirical finding, because given
the higher product price as a consequence of the protectionist policy, innovation with
the same quality should be assigned with a greater value by the stock market, which
makes the decline in the returns to R&D the indicator of an even deeper drop in the
innovation quality than with a fixed price.
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4.4.7 Extension: Effect of Permanent Protection
What if the protection extends to both periods and becomes permanent? An
empirical answer cannot be found from this event study, where the protection had
lasted for five years only. On the other hand, the theoretical model suggests that
with permanent protection, there are more firms engaging in innovation, while not
predicting which projects will be adopted.
Denote by #= and #−= the index sets of firms taking no innovation (subscript =)
and that of firms taking either the short-term or long-term innovation (subscript −=),
both under no protection (superscript #). Similarly, let %= and %−= be the sets of
those firms under the permanent protection.







All that can be said about the effect of a permanent protectionist policy is that
it encourages innovation, for the payoff from innovating increases in both periods.
It is indeterministic though, that how firms would shift between the short-term and
long-term projects, without further restrictions on the model parameters.
4.5 Tests of the Theory
In this section, I revisit the empirics to see if the major implication of my theory
can be supported by the data. My theory implies that during the first U.S.-Japan
Semiconductor Trade Agreement, when the anti-dumping provision was in effect, the
input-output relationship of R&D should have been stronger in the short-term and
weaker in the long-term, compared with the case under the second agreement; this
term structure of R&D should be specific to the semiconductor industry.
To test the above hypothesis, I employ the local projection method proposed
by Jordà (2005), which generates the impulse response function by regressing the
dependent variable on the independent variable at different time horizons. Following
Montiel Olea and Plagborg-Møller (2020) and Plagborg-Møller and Wolf (2020), I use
the following specification for local projection:






In the above, the firm-year innovation value ()B<), and R&D expenditure ('),
both in 1982 million U.S. dollars, serve as the measures for the output and input of
R&D activities. The impulse response function of the output on the input of R&D
is captured by [ℎ with ℎ from −4 to 6. I choose the largest time horizon to be six
years because each of the two policy regimes concerned has a duration of five years;
the negative time horizons are for placebo test – they should generate insignificant
estimates.
I run the local projection regression (4.19) using samples from the semiconductor
and non-semiconductor sectors, respectively. For each sample, I run two separate re-
gressions using observations whose R&D expenditures are from 1986 to 1991 (the first
agreement), and from 1991 to 1996 (the second agreement). The figure below plots
the estimated impulse response functions of innovation value to the R&D expenditure,
together with their 90% confidence interval.
Figure 4·3: Impulse Response of Innovation Value on R&D Expendi-
ture
Panel (a) uses observations with SIC code 3674: Semiconductors and Related Devices;
panel (b) from other U.S. manufacturing industries. The confidence interval collapses at
horizon ℎ = −1 because the one-year lag of the dependent variable is included as a
covariate.
Panel (a) of Figure 4·3 shows the impulse response function of the firm-year inno-
vation value to R&D expenditure. There are three noteworthy differences between the
two policy regimes. Firstly, in the pre-1991 regime, the R&D output one year ahead
is significantly affected by the R&D input, while the same estimate in the post-1991
regime is lower in quantity and insignificant. Secondly, current R&D input begins to
lose its impact on future innovation value from the third year onwards in the pre-
1991 regime, whereas it does so from the fourth year in the post-1991 regime. Finally,
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over the horizons from the second to the fifth year, the impact of RDE is greater in
the post-1991 regime. All of these three findings suggest that the R&D expenditure
has a greater influence on the innovation value in the long-term under the second
agreement, where the temporary protection was lifted. Meanwhile, these patterns
are not found in panel (b) obtained from the non-semiconductor sectors. Moreover,
what panel (b) shows is contrary to the above three findings. Such cross-regime and
cross-industry contrast is consistent with the prediction of my theory.
I also perform an alternative test for my theory, which is non-parametric and more
straightforward: I firstly detrend the natural log of firm-year innovation value and




)̂ B<8,C+ℎ, ' 8,C) (4.20)
For the two policy regimes. I plot the distributed correlation between the detrended
output and input of R&D activities for both the semiconductor and non-semiconductor
sectors for comparison:










Figure 4·4: Distributed Correlation between RDE and Future Inno-
vation Value
Correlation coefficients are calculated between the detrended natural log of current R&D
expenditure and that of the distributed future patent values from one to five years ahead.
Panel (a) uses observations with SIC code 3674: Semiconductors and Related Devices;
panel (b) from other U.S. manufacturing industries.
Panel (a) of Figure 4·4 shows that for the semiconductor industry, the long-term
correlation between the input and output of R&D is considerably greater when the
protection was removed than when it was in place. Panel (b) of the same figure shows
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that this contrast is specific to the semiconductor industry where the policy change
happened. This simple but straightforward test, along with the previous one using
the local projection method, provides supportive evidence for my theory in Section
4.4, that the term structure of R&D projects adopted by the U.S. semiconductor firms




5.1 On the Dynamics of Productivity Dispersion
Chapters 2 and 3 investigate the role of R&D heterogeneity in countercyclical
productivity dispersion and productivity growth. In Chapter 2, I provide empirical
evidence that dispersion in productivity, as well as in R&D intensity, responds posi-
tively to the negative profit shock at the industry level. To explore the mechanism, I
build a technology ladder model where heterogeneous R&D costs determine the gap
of technology levels between two firms in the stationary equilibrium. I parameterize
the model by structural estimation. In the simulation of this quantitative model, in
response to a negative shock with realistic magnitude, the low R&D cost firm in-
creases its R&D effort on average, and the high-cost firm decreases its R&D effort.
This is because the leading firm has the incentive to recover the lost profit through
improving its productivity, while the following firm finds innovation profitable due to
the shock.
In Chapter 3, I test the above mechanism by two empirical tests, one parametric
and the other semiparametric. Both of them show that in response to an industry-
level negative profit shock, firms with high R&D intensity in the past raise their RDI,
and firms with low RDI in the past reduce theirs. Such empirical evidence verifies
my explanation of countercyclical productivity dispersion by R&D heterogeneity.
Using the structurally estimated model, I also find that aggregate productivity
grows at a higher rate following a negative profit shock. This is because, in response
to such a shock, the increase in the industrial leader’s R&D dominates the decrease
in that of the follower. Finally, in my counterfactual study, I find that mildly raising
the technological spillover rate results in higher stationary productivity growth rate
through encouraging R&D competition; but increasing the spillover rate by too much
makes imitation too easy, and thus dampens the incentive for innovation, leading to
a lower stationary growth rate of productivity. For different counterfactual spillover
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rates, after the same negative profit shock, productivity dispersion is found to be
positively associated with the size of the jump in productivity growth rate. This is
because they are both driven by the same mechanism of R&D heterogeneity. And it
is in this sense that productivity dispersion is good in bad times, as it suggests faster
growth in aggregate productivity.
5.2 On the Quality and Timing of Innovation
In Chapter 4, I use the 1986-1996 U.S.-Japan semiconductor trade conflict for
an event study, and find that the U.S. semiconductor firms exhibited higher returns
to R&D without protectionist policy than when under protection. The empirical
finding that such changes in R&D performance were not due to variation in the scale
of R&D input, which suggests that these concerned firms had adopted R&D projects
with lower quality when they were protected, and switch to those with higher quality
when the protection was removed.
I propose a theory where firms choose from short-term and long-term innova-
tion projects. In my model, temporary protectionist policy raises the profitability
of protected firms in the short-term, driving some firms to switch from long-term to
short-term innovation. By doing so, these firms trade quality for a faster realization
of innovation, so that they can benefit from the protection in a timely fashion. I
test the theory using local projection and distributed correlation, both methods show
that the U.S. semiconductor firms’ R&D input had a greater impact over a longer
time horizon after the protection was lifted, and similar patterns are not found in
other industries over the same period. In this way, my theory on the tradeoff between
quality and timing of R&D projects, as well as on how firms’ decisions over them may






I use CRSP/Compustat Merged (CCM) Database for firm fundamentals reported
at the annual frequency. Individuals in this database is a subset of U.S. publicly listed
firms. They can be identified in two ways: either by CRSP’s permanent company
and security identifiers (permco or permno), or by Compustat’s permanent company
identifier (gvkey). Variables to be used include R&D expense (xrd), sale (sale),
number of employees (emp), book value of capital (ppent), value added output (ouput)
and etc.
Industry-level Cost Shares and Prices Deflators
The industry-level cost shares and price deflators are obtained from the NBER-
CES Manufacturing Database, which can be merged to the CCM database mentioned
above by the four-digit SIC codes. The NBER-CES database informs on industry-level
payroll (pay), value added (vadd), shipment price deflator (piship), investment price
deflator (piinv) and etc. These variables combined with those firm fundamentals are
used to estimate revenue TFP, I shall elaborate on how in a later subsection.
Patent Value
To evaluate the outcome of firms’ R&D activities, I employ the patent value
dataset published by Kogan et al. (2017). They estimate the private value (or market
value) and scientific value of each U.S. patent issued from 1926 to 2010 that can be
matched to a publicly listed firm. Their approach is to measure the patent value by
the response of the stock market to the news of the issuance in a short (two days) time
window. They then aggregate patent-level value to firm-year level, and the outcome
can be matched to the CCM database through the permanent company and security
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identifier.
The difference between the firm-year private patent value (tsm) and the firm-year
scientific patent value (tcw) is that for the latter patents are weighted by the number
of forward citations. Both measures are scaled by firm size approximated by book
assets. In this thesis, I use the variable of private value.
The authors also provide the levels of innovation values, still categorized as stock
market based and citation weighted. These unscaled measured are vulnerable to firm
size, making the comparison between innovations done by firms with different ages
difficult to interpret, and therefore not suitable for this study.
A.2 Data Pre-processing
For the CRSP/Compustat merged data, I restrict the sample to the U.S–based
firms that provide final versions of statements. We omit regulated utilities (SIC
codes 4900 to 5000) and financial firms (SIC codes 6000 to 7000), get rid of firm-year
observations with values of acquisitions greater than 5% of assets, and keep only if the
firm exists in the data for at least two years. I also drop observations with negative or
missing book value of assets, the book value of capital, number of employees, capital
investment or revenue. Because Compustat records end-of-year capital values, we
shift the reported book value forward one year.
For each industry defined by a four-digit SIC code and year in the NBER-CES
database, I compute the following two variables: the labor share in value added
(payroll cost divided by value added, with the variable name labshare), the ratio
of value added to gross output (vaddfrac). I then replace these two variables by
their respective 10-year moving average, and generate the capital share (capshare)
as the residual of the labor share, where I make the underlying assumption that the
production function is homogeneous of degree one in labor and capital.
Finally, merge the above two datasets by industry and year indicator (gvkey and
year, respectively), and then merge with it the Kogan et al. (2017) firm innovation
value dataset by the permanent company and security identifier (permno) and year.
This yields an unbalanced panel dataset, whose time spans annually from 1970 to
2010, and covers 4,074 firms (identified by Compustat’s permanent company identifier,
gvkey) out of 135 four-digit SIC industries. There are 43,800 observations in total.
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A.3 Construction of Key Variables
Revenue Total Factor Productivity (TFPR)
The revenue TFP in this thesis is estimated using the cost-share based approach.
Define variable cap to be the book value of capital (ppent in CCM) deflated by
the investment deflator (piinv from the NBER-CES database). And define variable
output as sale multiplied by the value added to gross output ratio (vaddfrac), and
then deflated by the shipments deflator (piship). The log TFPR is calculated as
follows:
log)%8, 9 ,C = log(>DC?DC8, 9 ,C) − 20?Bℎ0A4 9 ,C log(20?8, 9 ,C) − ;01Bℎ0A4 9 ,C log(4<?8, 9 ,C).
(A.31)
In this way, log_tfp is the residual of revenue that is not explained by the factors
capital and labor in a production function homogeneous of degree one, whose factor
shares are invariant across firms in each industry.
R&D Expenditure (RDE) and Intensity (RDI)
The CCM database provides firm-year observations of R&D expenses (xrd), I
scale it by firm size, approximated by sale, to get the RDI.
In Section 3.3 where R&D intensity is concerned, I take the natural log of RDI
(log_rdi) as the explained variable instead of using the level of it, because the latter
is highly right-skewed, with mean 4.49 and the maximum as high as 25684.40. This
may be the result of the fact some firms may have sales close to zero at times when
their RDE is far from zero. For the same reason, in Section 2.2, the natural log of
sale (log_sale) is used as the explained variable in the local projection models.
Control Variables
Throughout the empirical studies in Sections 2.2 and 3.3, the sets of the firm-
and industry-level control variables are consistent and are elaborated as follows. The
firm-level controls are:
1. Firm age (age): current year minus the year of first appearance of the firm.
2. One-year lag of natural log of revenue TFP (log_tfp).
3. One-year lag of natural log of capital (log_cap).
4. One-year lag of natural log of number of employees (log_emp).
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5. One-year lag of market share (mkshare). The market share is the ratio of the
firm-year sale to the sum of sales from all firms in its industry-year cell.
There are two industry-level control variables:
1. One-year lag of number of firms in the industry-year cells (nfirm).
2. One-year lag of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) (hhi). The description
of HHI is in footnote 3 on page 4.
A.4 Descriptive Statistics
The standard descriptive statistics of variables mentioned in the previous sub-
section reported in Table A.1 below. The statistics of RDI is from the sample after
dropping outliers, whose reason was introduced previously in subsection A.3. The last
two variables are calculated at the industry-year instead of firm-year level because of
the way they are constructed.
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables
Variable name Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
tsm 0.16 0.39 0.00 12.67
log_rdi 1.80 1.96 −5.64 14.76
age 12.07 10.73 1 60
log_tfp 2.19 1.24 −8.87 8.61
log_cap 2.74 2.45 −7.07 11.46
log_emp −0.30 2.06 −6.91 6.75
log_sale 4.32 2.32 −6.91 12.96
mkshare 0.11 0.21 0.00 1
nfirm 8.77 12.33 1 133




B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
In stochastic Bellman equation (2.8), the composite arriving time / ∈ (0,∞)
follows exponential distribution:












Let. = 4−d/ < 1, it can be shown that. follows a Beta distribution: . ∼ Beta(_/d, 1),
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where B(G, H) =
∫ 1
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) + ℎ · 1{Δ=8 ≠ 0} + d
. (B.1.5)
Substitute equations (B.1.4) and (B.1.5) into Bellman equation (2.8), I derive the
optimization system as in Proposition 1. The boundary conditions are from the fact
that a firm has no incentive to do R&D at the maximal technology gap <.
The existence of a Markov Perfect Equilbrium is guaranteed by the application
of Kakutani’s Fixed-Point Theorem. An easy representation is Theorem 5.11.15 in
Corbae, Stinchcombe and Zeman (2009). 
B.2 Proof of Proposition 3
By the symmetry of the game, firms  and  have the same value function and
policy function1. Therefore, {Δ= (C)} and {Δ= (C)} have the same limiting distribu-
tion `. By definition of the technology gap, Δ= (C) = −Δ= (C), thus for any < ∈ M,
`8 = lim
C→∞
Pr(Δ= (C) = <) = lim
C→∞
Pr(Δ= (C) = −<) = lim
C→∞
Pr(Δ= (C) = −<) = `2<+2−8.
Since M8 = −M2<+2−8, lim
C→∞
E [Δ= (C)] =
2<+1∑
8=1
`8M8 = 0. 
B.3 Proof of Lemma 2





(<) for some <, otherwise E (<) > E (<) for all < because
firm  has lower marginal cost of R&D.
1Otherwise it’s easy to show there is contradiction by switching firm labels
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Now let firm  play ’s strategy, and denote firm ’s best response by 0br

. Com-


























because the positions of the two





(<) for some <. This contradicts that equilibrium strategy
0∗

is the best response to 0∗

. This is because firm  faces the same problem when
 plays 0∗

as  faces in the original MPE. However, the marginal cost of R&D is









(<) for all <, and this inequality holds strictly for some <.
This implies that for any C > 0 and any : ∈ {1, 2, · · · , <},
Pr
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The last equality is derived from the symmetry of this dynamical system: once the
initial states and R&D are flipped and strategies of players  and  swapped, the
random variable Δ# 5 (C) is governed by the same stochastic process which Δ#− 5 (C)
initially follows. For the same reason,
Pr
(















for any C > 0 and any : ∈ {−<,−< + 1, · · · , 0}.
89
















, i.e. firm  can





it chooses not to, which contradicts the rational agent assumption. Therefore, the
major premise, that the existence of <0 ∈ M such that E (<0) ≤ E (<0), is false. 









(0). To see this, notice
that from Corollary 1,
E 5 (1) − E 5 (0) =
1
_0∗− 5 (−1) + d + ℎ
[
c 5 (1) +
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[E (1) − E (1)] − [E (−1) − E (−1)] = [E (1) − E (−1)] − [E (1) − E (−1)]







































On the other hand, from Corollary 1, in the case < = 1, I have

























































Equations (B.4.4) and (B.4.5) implies





(−1) + d + ℎ
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_0∗ (−1) + ℎ
)
(E (0) + E (0))
]
(B.4.6)






for all 0 ≥ 0,
it’s easy to show that k (0) < k (0) for all 0 > 0. Therefore, in equation (B.4.6),
[E (1) − E (1)] − [E (−1) − E (−1)] > 0 when arrival rate multiplier _ > 0 is small































B.5 Proof of Lemma 4
Define the lower contour set C 5
(
E |3 5 , 3− 5
)
the set of all strategy profiles









{0 (C), 0 (C)}∞C=0 : J5
(
3 5 , 3− 5
 {0 5 (C), 0− 5 (C)}∞C=0)} (B.5.1)
It is important that both contour sets C and C, whenever non-empty, have their
elements in the same order of the strategies of firms  and , otherwise any operation
of these two sets is meaningless.
Fix 3 and 3, suppose for each 5 ∈ {, }, value function E 5 is de-
fined at (3 5 , 3− 5 ) and (3 5 + 1, 3− 5 + 1). By profit function in Assumption 3,
for any arbitrary strategy profile {0̃ (C), 0̃ (C)}∞C=0, J5
(
3 5 , 3− 5
 {0̃ (C), 0̃ (C)}∞C=0) >
J5
(
3 5 + 1, 3− 5 + 1
 {0̃ (C), 0̃ (C)}∞C=0). Therefore, for 5 ∈ {, },
C 5
(


















where mC means the boundary of set C.






(C) |3 + 1, 3 + 1
}∞
C=0
belongs to C 5
(
E 5 (3 5 + 1, 3− 5 + 1) |3 5 + 1, 3− 5 + 1
)
, but not to
C 5
(









E 5 (3 5 + 1, 3− 5 + 1) |3 5 , 3− 5
)
≠ ∅. (B.5.4)









belongs to C 5
(
E 5 (3 5 + 1, 3− 5 + 1) |3 5 , 3− 5
)
. If it doesn’t, by the definition of lower con-
tour set, it implies E 5 (3 5 , 3− 5 ) > E 5 (3 5 + 1, 3− 5 + 1) and the proof thus finishes. If
it does, by (B.5.3) and (B.5.4), firm 5 can deviate to any strategy in the non-empty
difference set in (B.5.4), where for any strategy − 5 can choose, firm 5 will end up








consists of the optimal strategies for both firms. 
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B.6 Proof of Proposition 7
Suppose the state prior to the shock is (3, 3). For either firm 5 ∈ {, },
by Lemma 4, both E 5 (3 5 + : − 1, 3− 5 + :) and E 5 (3 5 + :, 3− 5 + :) are mono-
tonically decreasing in : and bounded below by zero. Therefore, as X → 0+,
lim
:→∞
E 5 (3 5 + : − 1, 3− 5 + :) and lim
:→∞




E 5 (3 5 + : − 1, 3− 5 + :) − E 5 (3 5 + :, 3− 5 + :)
]
= 0, or that for any Y > 0,
there exists ̃ (Y) such that for both 5 =  and 5 = , E 5 (3 5 + : −1, 3− 5 + :) − E 5 (3 5 +
:, 3− 5 + :) < Y if : ≥ ̂ (Y). By Proposition 5 and the strict increasingness of R&D
cost function k 5 (Assumption 2), this implies that for either firm, the equilibrium
R&D effort satisfies 0∗
5
(3 5 , 3− 5 ) > 0∗5 (3 5 + :, 3− 5 + :) for : large enough. 
B.7 Proof of Proposition 8
Without loss of generality, suppose lim
B→C−
3 (B) = 0. Firstly discuss the case where
lim
B→C−
3 (B) < <. By updating rule (2.24) and first-order condition (2.28), lim
B→C−
0∗ (B) =
k−1 (_ [E (0, 3 + 1) − E (0, 3)]), and 0∗ (C) = k
−1

(_ [E (0, 3 + 1) − E (1, 3 + 1)]).








3 (B) = <. By boundary condtion (2.29), lim
B→C−
0∗ (B) = 0. Again by first-
order condtion (2.28), 0∗





0∗ (B) holds. 
B.8 Proof of Proposition 9
By production function (3.3), at any time C, the expected ratio of productivity is











From (2.20), as C → ∞, the distribution of Δ# (C) and of Δ# (C + g) are identical
for any g > 0, and is given by P (Δ# (C) = <) = P (Δ# (C + g) = <) = `(<) for any




















I (C + g)
I (C + g)
]
, ∀g > 0. (B.8.2)
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For the output G 5 (C), it can be shown that it is a function of productivity I 5 (C)
and prices ? 5 (C), ?− 5 (C):
G 5 (C) =
? 5 (C)−f
? 5 (C)1−f + ?− 5 (C)1−f
, f =
1
1 − U (B.8.3)
? 5 (C) =
1 − UZ 5 (C)
U
(
1 − Z 5 (C)
) I 5 (C)−# 5 (C) . (B.8.4)
In the second equation above, Z 5 (C) is firm 5 ’s revenue, and is an implicit function




, as can be seen from (3.5). Therefore, the




{ [1 − UZ (Δ# (C))] / [U (1 − Z (Δ# (C)))]
[1 − UZ (−Δ# (C))]
/




which is unique determined by the technology gap Δ# (C). As above mentioned, the
gap, as C →∞, is identically distributed at C and C + g for any g > 0. For this reason,
the expected ratio of output between the two firms is also a constant in the long run.

B.9 Proof of Lemma 5
On a sufficiently small interval [C, C + ΔC], the behavior of the Poisson counting
process # (C) satisfies2:
P (# (C + ΔC) = # (C)) = exp[−_(C)ΔC], (B.9.1)
P (# (C + ΔC) = # (C) + 1) = _(C)ΔC exp[−_(C)ΔC], (B.9.2)
P (# (C + ΔC) ≥ # (C) + 2) = 1 − (1 + _(C)ΔC) exp[−_(C)ΔC] . (B.9.3)
2See Gallager (1995), page 36.
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= [- (# (C + 1)) − - (# (C))] _(C). (B.9.4)
And the proof finishes. 
B.10 Proof of Proposition 10
When the shock happens at C > 0, both the levels and gap of technology remain
unchanged, unless an innovation arrives exactly at the moment C. That event of





# 5 (B) = # 5 (C)
)





Δ# 5 (B) = Δ# 5 (C)
)
= 1, ∀ 5 ∈ {, }. (B.10.2)
Consider the expected instantaneous growth rate of firm 5 ’s productivity I 5 when





= (W − 1)
[
_0∗5 (C) + ℎ × 1
{
Δ= 5 (C) < 0
}]
(B.10.3)
















_0∗5 (B) + ℎ × 1
{








_0∗5 (B) + ℎ × 1
{






_0∗5 (B) + ℎ × 1
{




_0∗5 (C) + ℎ × 1
{








For the expected instantaneous growth rate of output G 5 (C), the argument is sim-








is also a function of 0∗
5
(C) and Δ= 5 (C),
as can be seen from (B.8.3), (B.8.4) and (3.5). The proof of the case where  = 1 is
different from above only in that it uses Proposition 8 instead of Proposition 7. 
B.11 Proof of Proposition 12
Denote the index set of domestic firms taking innovation scheme ] ∈ {=, B, ;} by
]. Assume the following two types of equilibrium doesn’t exist:
Type 1: ∃] ∈ {=, B, ;}, such that `(]) = `() (` is the Lebesgue measure);
Type 2: ∃], ]′ ∈ {=, B, ;}, ] ≠ ]′, such that `(]) > 0, `(]′) > 0 and `(]) + `(]′) =
`().
If the above assumption doesn’t hold, then the proposition is proved automatically.
Otherwise, I will show there must exist an equilibrium of the third type:
Type 3: ∀] ∈ {=, B, ;}, `(]) > 0.
Let 2 = inf
{
2 9 | 9 ∈ 
}
and 2 = sup
{
2 9 | 9 ∈ 
}
. By Lemma 6, Lemma 7 and
Proposition 11, in an equilibrium satisfying condition 3 above, there exists 2̂! , 2̂ ∈
(2, 2), 2̂! < 2̂ , such that for any 9 ∈  ,
 9 =

=, if 2 9 > 2̂
B, if 2̂! < 2 9 ≤ 2̂
;, if 2 9 ≤ 2̂! .
(B.11.1)
Hence it suffices to prove the existence of 2̂! and 2̂ with which no domestic firm has
the incentive to deviate from its current innovation decision.
For arbitrary 2! ∈ (2, 2), let all domestic firms with 2 9 ≤ 2! take  9 = ;, then let
all the other domestic firms choose from {=, B}. Suppose there is a cutoff 2 ∈ [2! , 2],
such that all domestic firms with 2 9 > 2 choose  9 = =; and all domestic firms with














































It is obvious that _C (2 |2!) (C = 1, 2) is strictly increasing in 2 . By (4.15), the dif-
ference in firm value between not innovating and adopting the short-term innovation
project for a firm with endowed unit cost at the cutoff 2 is




















+ 5B . (B.11.4)
Thus Δ+=−B (2 |2!) is strictly increasing in 2 . Let’s find the equilibrium cutoff 2̂ (2!)
in the subgame characterized by 2!. If all firms with 2 9 > 2! do not innovate and
Δ+=−B (2! |2!) ≥ 0, then none of these firms has incentive to deviate, in which case
2̂ (2!) = 2!; similarly, If all firms with 2 9 > 2! take short-term innovation and
Δ+=−B (2 |2!) ≤ 0, 2̂ (2!) = 2. If Δ+=−B (2! |2!) < 0 and Δ+=−B (2 |2!) > 0, by the strong
monotonicity of Δ+=−B (2 |2!) in 2 and Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists a
unique 2̂ ∈ (2! , 2) such that Δ+=−B (2̂ |2!) = 0, in which case no firm with 2 9 > 2!
would ever deviate.
The 2!-subgame equilibrium is unique. Suppose the contrary is true, that is,
for the same fixed 2!, there exist two equilibrium cutoffs 2̂1, 2̂2 ∈ [2! , 2], and
2̂1 < 2̂2. For any firm with 2 9 ∈ (2̂1, 2̂2), it prefers  9 = = when (_1, _2) =
(_1(2̂1 |2!), _2(2̂1 |2!)), and prefers  9 = B when (_1, _2) = (_1(2̂2 |2!), _2(2̂2 |2!)).
Since (_1(2̂1 |2!), _2(2̂1 |2!)) < (_1(2̂2 |2!), _2(2̂2 |2!)), it contradicts equation
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(4.15), which implies Δ+=−B is increasing in either _1 and _2.
Now that 2̂ is uniquely determined by 2!, it suffices to show there exists a unique
2̂! ∈ (2, 2) where Δ+B−; (2̂! , _1(2̂!), _2(2̂!)) = Δ+B−; (2̂!) = 0. Note it is impossible that
Δ+B−; (2) ≥ 0 or Δ+B−; (2) ≤ 0, otherwise it can be shown that an equilibrium of type 1
or type 2 at the beginning of this proof exists, violating the initial assumption. Since
Δ+B−; (2) < 0 and Δ+B−; (2) > 0, by continuity of Δ+B−; (2) and the Intermediate Value
Theorem, there exists a 2̂! ∈ (2, 2) such that Δ+B−; (2̂!) = 0. With such 2̂! and 2̂ ,
no firm has incentive to deviate from innovation strategy (B.11.1). Thus the proof
for the existence of equilibrium is finished.
It remains to prove the uniqueness of equilibrium. I will show the uniqueness of
type-3 equilibrium, and the proof for the non-existence of multiple equilibria within
or across types follows a similar argument.
Suppose there are two type-3 equilibria, call them 1 and 2, since 2̂ is uniquely
determined by 2̂!, it cannot be that 2̂1! = 2̂
2
!



















2 . It is clear from equation (4.17) that Δ+B−; is decreasing in _1 and increasing
in _2. Hence for all firms who prefer the short-term project to the long-term one in









. It is definite in this case that _11 > _
2





the argument is identical to that in Case 1. If _12 ≥ _
2
2 , by equation (4.15), all firms
who find the short-term project superior to not innovating in 1 should do the same









. It must be that _12 < _
2




1 then it is the same
as Case 1. If _11 ≤ _
2
1 , again by (4.15), all firms who prefer not innovating to the




From the discussion of the above three cases, mutually exclusive and collectively











disproved. Thus there cannot be multiple type-3 equilibria. This proof strategy can
be applied to show the uniqueness of equilibrium for the other two types, which I do
not replicate here. 
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B.12 Proof of Proposition 13
Following the proof of Proposition 11 and Proposition 12, I denote 2̂#
!
∈ (2, 2)
the equilibrium cutoff of endowed cost with which firms are indifferent between the










similar interpretations in equilibrium under the temporary protectionist policy.








. Otherwise, by (B.11.2)






2 . By equation (4.17), there exists X > 0 such that
for all domestic firms 9 with 2 9 ∈ (2̂)! , 2̂)! + X) should choose the long-term instead of
short-term innovation project.





























) will choose the short-













, it is certain
that _#2 < _
)





to be rationalized, it must be _#1 > _
)
1 , and from
here it goes back to the previous argument in the same paragraph.








is also impossible. Otherwise it is
definite that _#2 > _
)





to be true, it must be _#1 < _
)



















B.13 Proof of Proposition 14















2 . And everything else follows the same as the proof of Proposition 13 just
with modification to notations. 
B.14 Proof of Proposition 15
It suffices to show that the cutoff in endowed cost with which a domestic firm
is indifferent between no innovation and short-term innovation without protection,
2̂#









, in which case _#1 > _
%
1 must hold, otherwise it




, but then _#2 > _
%










implies _#1 > _
%
1 , I will show the latter is impossible. I will
discuss the following two mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive cases.






2 . According to (4.15), there exists some X > 0, such
that all firms with 2 9 in neighborhood +X (2̂#) will prefer short-term innovation to no





















implies _#2 > _
%










To determine parameter ^ 5 , 5 ∈ {, } as in the R&D cost function (3.6), I use
equation (3.7) derived from the first-order condition with respect to the R&D effort.
The R&D cost k 5 (0) is approximated empirically by R&D expenditure (RDE) from
the data; firm value is approximated by the market value in the data; finally, I use
the gross profit as a proxy for profit in the model.
In this way, denote the unscaled firm-year innovation value and RDE by )B<8, 9 ,C
























× 1{238, 9 ,C = 1}, (C.1.2)
where  are ) are the numbers of industries and years in the sample, and # 9 C the
number of firms in industry-year cell ( 9 , C). Indicators 1{28
8, 9 ′,C = 1} and 1{238, 9 ′,C = 1}
are defined in (3.16), and is used to distinguish low- and high-cost firms in data.
Here it means that I’m treating the firms with log-RDI between the second and third
deciles in its industry-year cell as representative for the low-cost firm in my model; and
those between the seventh and eighth deciles for the high-cost firm. In the model, the
low-cost firm, in expectation, exerts more R&D effort than the high-cost firm under
the stationary distribution.
The sample mean is firstly taken within each industry-year cell, then averaged









(Δ= |\), 0∗ (Δ= |\)
}
Δ==−Δ=∈M is conditional on \. By Proposition 2,
the stationary distribution `(< |\), < ∈ M is also a function on parameter set \.
Letting \ = (U, W, ℎ), the three parameters to be determined, I construct selected
moments using the stationary distribution, and calculate their weighted distance to
their counterparts in the data. This distance is then minimized over the parameter
space to pin down the value of \. The following is a step-by-step summary of my
approach regarding the GMM estimation.
1. There needs to be three targeted moments for estimation. The first one is


























where the profit function c is determined by (3.4) and (3.5).
2. With a fixed set of parameters \, I solve the baseline model numerically, and
obtain the stationary distribution `(\) using the transition rate matrix & and






















`(< |\) c (< |\)
c (−< |\)
. (C.2.6)
3. Now calculate the corresponding moments from data, denoted Φ = (Φ1,Φ2,Φ3).
While doing so I use RDE to approximate the R&D cost k, and firm value by
its market value, <:E; the profit is measured by gross profit 6?, also available







8 A348, 9 ,C × 1{288, 9 ,C = 1}∑








8 <:E8, 9 ,C × 1{288, 9 ,C = 1}∑








8 6?8, 9 ,C × 1{288, 9 ,C = 1}∑
8 6?8, 9 ,C × 1{238, 9 ,C = 1}
; (C.2.9)
Take the calculation of Φ1 for example. Firstly for each industry-year cell ( 9 , C),
take the sum of RDE over the eighth and third decile groups, respectively.
Secondly, compute the ratio of these two sums. This is equivalent to computing
the ratio of the means of the RDE from these two decile groups, because the
number of observations in each group is equal by definition. Finally, compute the
mean of this ratio across all industry-year cells. This is the sample counterpart
of moment (C.2.1), the expected ratio of R&D costs. The similar can be said
for (C.2.8) and (C.2.9).
4. Let ,̂ be the covariance matrix of variables
∑
8 A388, 9 ,C × 1{288, 9 ,C = 1}∑
8 A388, 9 ,C × 1{238, 9 ,C = 1}
,∑
8 <:E8, 9 ,C × 1{288, 9 ,C = 1}∑
8 <:E8, 9 ,C × 1{238, 9 ,C = 1}
and
∑
8 6?8, 9 ,C × 1{288, 9 ,C = 1}∑
8 6?8, 9 ,C × 1{238, 9 ,C = 1}
, invert it to get ,̂−1. The
weighted distance between q(\) = (q1(\), q2(\), q3(\)) and Φ is a function of
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the parameter set \:
 (\) = (q(\) −Φ)′ ,̂−1 (q(\) −Φ) . (C.2.10)
This estimator is minimized over the parameter space
{(U, W, ℎ) : 0 < U < 1, W > 1, ℎ > 0}, and the minimizer is the estimated
values. Since the dimension is low, I use the grid search method to find the




As mentioned in Section 3.2.3, in the simulation, the continuous time is discretized
into ) = 300 periods. These periods are of equal length ΔC > 0. The step of firm
5 ∈ {, } along the technology ladder, # 5 (C), is a Poisson Process, whose arrival
rate _ 5 (C) is
_ 5 (C) = _0∗5 (C) + ℎ × 1{# 5 (C) < #− 5 (C)}. (D.0.1)
In this equation, 0∗
5
(C) is the equilibrium R&D effort of firm 5 . In MPE, it is state-







, as in Corollary 1.
From Proof B.9 of Lemma 5, on a sufficiently small interval [C, C+ΔC], the behavior
of the Poisson process # 5 (C) can be approximated by
P
(
# 5 (C + ΔC) − # 5 (C) = 0
)
= exp[−_ 5 (C)ΔC] ≈ 1 − _ 5 (C)ΔC, (D.0.2)
P
(
# 5 (C + ΔC) − # 5 (C) = 1
)
=_ 5 (C)ΔC exp[−_ 5 (C)ΔC] ≈ _ 5 (C)ΔC, (D.0.3)
P
(
# 5 (C + ΔC) − # 5 (C) ≥ 2
)
=1 − (1 + _ 5 (C)ΔC) exp[−_ 5 (C)ΔC] ≈ 0. (D.0.4)
Using this approximation, for either firm 5 , I generate a 1×) sequence ? 5 (C) to store
the jumping probability _ 5 (C)ΔC, where the length of interval ΔC takes value 0.05.
Then for each period C = 1, · · · , ) , I generate * 5 (C) from i.i.d. uniform distribution
* [0, 1] for either firm. From C = 2 on, if * 5 (C) < ? 5 (C − 1), let #̂ 5 (C) = #̂ 5 (C −
1) + 11; otherwise #̂ 5 (C) = #̂ 5 (C − 1). In this way, in period C, innovation arrives with
probability ? 5 (C−1), so the random arrivals of innovations as approximated by (D.0.2)
∼ (D.0.4) are programmed. Such updating rule is identical for every repetition 1 in
the simulation.
When the updating rule of #̂ (C), #̂ (C) are so determined, that of the technology
gap Δ#̂ (C) is a free by-product by taking their difference: Δ#̂ (C) = #̂ (C) − #̂ (C).
1Like in Section 3.2.3, notation #̂ is used for the discrete analogue of the continuous-time process
#.
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As regards the automatic catching up when the innovating firm is at the maximum
technology gap <, I add to the updating rule that for either firm 5 , if Δ#̂ 5 (C−1) = <,
* 5 (C) < ? 5 (C − 1) and *− 5 (C) ≥ ?− 5 (C − 1), then #̂ 5 (C) = #̂ 5 (C − 1) + 1 and #̂− 5 (C) =
#̂− 5 (C − 1) + 1. In other word,when the leader is at the maximum gap and innovates,
the laggards automatically advances on step as well along the technology ladder, so
that the technology gap remains unchanged, even though no innovation is achieved
simultaneously by the latter.
For each repetition 1, the simulation begins with #̂,1 (1) = #̂,1 (1) = 1. Accord-
ingly, the initial state of distances to the technology frontier is set to be 3̂,1 (1) =
3̂,1 (1) = 0, as both firms are neck-to-neck on the frontier in the first period. The
updating of 3̂ 5 (C) follows the ruls specified by (2.24).
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